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2 July 1984

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LEADING PAPER COMMENTS ON SOVIET MISSILE DEPLOYMENT IN GDR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 May 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Protest Against Missiles"]

[Text] The Soviet Union's announcement of a new round of deployment of nuclear missiles in East Germany is regrettable news in the midst of international relations that are already strained. The new tactical nuclear missiles with increased range are the second phase of the new round of the arms race that began in January. At that time, it will be remembered, the Soviet Union deployed new nuclear missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

According to the TASS news agency the Soviet Union will continue deploying new missiles as long as the NATO countries led by the United States are deploying medium-range missiles on their own territory. The NATO Euro-missiles are in turn a response to the Soviet Union's Euro-missiles, which it has aimed against West Europe since 1977.

Each super power is increasing its number of nuclear missiles in response to additions by the other side. A striving for balance in traditional weapons is still understandable, but in regard to nuclear missiles the explanation has lost its meaning. After all, each side already has enough nuclear weapons to destroy the other side even after it has made a first strike.

The arms race is making us less secure than before. And the new missiles in East Germany are doing the same thing. They testify to the fact that the super powers have completely lost touch with each other and are substituting pressure tactics for attempts at negotiating.

In the past 20 years the number of European countries free of nuclear weapons has gone down sharply because of the arms race. In addition to the neutral countries, only a few countries in each military alliance are still free of nuclear weapons, and the people of those countries have no say in the nuclear armament of their areas. The arms race is more and more clearly irrational. For this reason a protest should be addressed to both super powers along with an appeal to return to negotiations.

9611

CSO: 3617/169

AID PROPOSAL FOR NICARAGUA TURNED DOWN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 May 84 p 2

[Article: "Nicaragua Will Not Be a Program Country for Development Aid"]

[Text] The Commission on Economic Relations with Developing Countries (TALKE) is recommending no new program countries for development aid. The commission recommends that the present countries be retained. They are Egypt, Kenya, Zambia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Vietnam.

The recommendation's second part concerns approving 3-year planning frameworks for development aid to Nicaragua, Burma, Peru and Mozambique. TALKE emphasizes continued cooperation with Nicaragua, for whose part it was observed that results of cooperation so far have been extremely positive. The Left has demanded that Nicaragua be raised to become one of the regular program countries, but no decision was made on that.

TALKE stressed in its statement that the results of cooperation must be watched closely, so that the qualitative goals established for the aid will be achieved. If it turns out that the aid does not meet the requirements set or that development of aid for some country becomes impossible for other reasons, a new decision on program countries will have to be made.

TALKE also approved on Wednesday a statement of general principles on Finland's mixed financing activity. The commission has a negative attitude toward this kind of joint use of development aid and export credits.

In the opinion of the commission "because of influences that may possibly distort development cooperation and trade with mixed financing, Finland should try as much as possible, especially within the OECD, to limit and regulate international use of mixed financing."

At the same time the commission approved, however, principles according to which mixed financing could, in its opinion, still take place in the future in certain situations.

9611

CSO: 3617/169

MITTERRAND POLICIES ON DEFENSE, THIRD WORLD, PCF EXAMINED

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French Spring 84 pp 25-39

[Article by Charles Zorgbibe, dean of the Paris-Sud Faculty of Law and co-president of the Atlantic Conference for the Study of the International System (he is the author of "International Relations," PUF [French University Press], second edition, 1978; "The Political Construction of Europe," PUF, 1978; "The Mediterranean Without the Great Nations?," PUF, 1980; and "Alliances in the World System," PUF, 1983): "Cubism and Diplomacy--The 1,000 Days of Francois Mitterand"]

[Text]

I

"An entirely plain mystery." This was the reading of Mitterand's patronymic transcribed into ideographs by Deng Xiaoping. We have been asking ourselves questions about the enigmas created by the triumph of Francois Mitterand in the French presidential competition since the summer of 1981. It is true that Gaulist mimicry can already be seen: the brilliant protagonist of the "continuing coup d'etat" has moulted into the finicky exegete of the "private preserve." But beyond the assignment of roles, a division of diplomatic labor characterized by the "eminent power" of the president, what vision of the world did the new chief of state have? Where was his diplomatic truthfulness, his real perception of international relations? In his firmness and his strictness as a champion of the West, put forth throughout the whole of the presidential campaign, or in the discussion of the class struggle pursued on the international level throughout the 10 years of rebuilding and development of the Socialist Party?

Three years later, the excessively rational nature of such a question is obvious. The new French diplomatic debate has erupted, as if freed of any relation with reality. The artist-statesman fragments international society, cuts it up and relates it as he pleases: he is constructing a universe consistent with his needs in full independence.

The foreign policy of Francois Mitterand has aspects of the pictorial art: in the manner of certain cubist trends, it seeks a simplification of form and volume. In an intensive creative effort, objects, cut and recut, are replaced on the background of the picture, losing their spatial expression. The international reality is taken apart, dissociated and referred to only fragmentarily. A flamboyant Atlantic orientation, neo-Gaullism, French-style "Ostpolitik," archaeo-Third Worldism, socialist-commercial realism--all are

abbreviated and ill-defined forms which are joined and interlinked in a surprising ballet. The Mitterrand cubist decoupage, the seeming linear confusion, this prodigious swarming of internal contradictions, this outburst of great and incomprehensible projects, these astonishing superimposed sheets on which Fourth Republic anatomical plates, North-South natural history and Gaullist fashion designs are intermingled, give birth to a marvelously incoherent diplomacy--a good match for the anarchic burgeoning of our present international system.

II

Under the vivid colors of pro-Atlantic sentiment or the firm stroke of neo-Gaullism, the Western roots of Francois Mitterrand are beyond challenge. Without a doubt a tactical concern has been present since 10 May 1981: it is imperative that the socialist regime provide guarantees of Western orthodoxy to allay the suspicions of the United States. Didn't Claude Cheysson cautiously admit, as early as 3 July 1981, to the Anglo-American press that "France will look the more favorably on the Atlantic Alliance since elements in the left, which is our majority, at one time tolerated a totalitarian approach to problems and praised the totalitarian approach of certain other countries..."? The courage, determination and sincerity of the chief of state are no less evident: is he not carrying his crusade for the Euromissiles even into the arena of the Socialist International? And is he not going so far as to appear, during his visits to Bonn and Brussels, as the unbending ally of the Christian democratic and liberal executive branches where the brotherly parties gripped by pacifism are concerned? Before the Bundestag on 20 January 1983, Francois Mitterrand made a profession of European-Atlantic faith. "Our analysis and our conviction tell us that nuclear weapons, whether we like it or deplore it, remain the guarantee of peace. The maintenance (of the balance of forces) requires, in my view, that whole regions of Europe cannot be left defenseless against the nuclear weapons specifically aimed at them. Whoever would place his money on the dissociation of the European and American continents would, in our view, be raising the question of the balance of forces and thus the maintenance of peace. I think and I say that such a dissociation is in itself dangerous...." Beyond the debate, concrete steps are tending to consolidate the French-German couple: as of February 1982, it was agreed with Chancellor Schmidt to implement the cooperation in the realm of defense for which the 1963 Elysees Treaty provided. In October 1983, it was agreed, this time involving the new Christian democratic chancellor, Kohl, to create a "permanent Franco-German commission on defense and security." Could Francois Mitterrand have succeeded, 20 years later, in resurrecting the "Fouchet plan?" Could he have succeeded in involving the FRG in the search for a specifically European defense?

Here the limitations, problems and contradictions inherent in the European-Atlantic field arise. Is Francois Mitterrand proposing, at the beginning of his 7-year term, to "renegotiate" the Atlantic Alliance in order to "return to it the content it has lost"--a strange proposal, because the alliance which would do the least harm to the identity of the new French political regime is that which would come down to a mutual aid mechanism, not that which, transformed into a veritable "community," would naturally tend to seek

homogeneity in the political regimes of the member nations? A few months later, the permanent French representative to the Alliance, the very brilliant Jean-Marie Merillon, stressed the need to limit the Atlantic organization to its original authority (rejecting, for example, any role for the scientific division of the Alliance in the preparation and "follow-up" of Western summit meetings).

At the same time, it is true, the dominance of the United States within the Alliance and the integrated military organization is becoming greater. On the one hand, the United States remains the only Western power which is developing nuclear weaponry for use against personnel, and the decision to use the Pershing 2 and cruise missile options depends solely on Washington, since 25 years earlier, the double-decision, "double-key" system was offered to those allies which welcomed the Thor and Jupiter missiles on their territory; on the other hand, the "Rogers doctrine," which leaves the responsibility for first use of tactical nuclear weapons to the enemy, calls for the strengthening of conventional forces and the development of highly sophisticated classical weaponry--to date, exclusively conceived and fabricated by the Americans.

Are there potential contradictions between the French nuclear doctrine and the European defense imperative? In "Here and Now," Francois Mitterrand said: "Is it a question of limiting ourselves to defense of the national sanctuary through nuclear deterrents? France has, then, no need at all for the neutron bomb, a battle weapon which it rejects. Should it have it to show solidarity with its partners in the Atlantic Alliance or the Brussels Treaty? France cannot then fail to participate in the frontline battle." This ambiguity was no longer mentioned when on 16 November 1983, the president of the republic outlined the prospects for a "European defense," setting forth a series of conditions some of which were entirely incompatible with others: the building of a veritable European defense, thus independent of the United States, without threatening the membership of the European nations in the Atlantic Alliance and without compromising French autonomy for decisions in the realm of nuclear deterrence! Wouldn't a European defense, in the strict sense of the term, on the contrary involve French renunciation of its strategic autonomy and a break by its European partners with the integrated Atlantic military organization? Another more immediate contradiction: the creation in the spring of 1983 of a "French rapid strike force," including the two divisions with specialized training in foreign intervention, is a guarantee of European solidarity--it can take action in Europe, along with France's allies, and contribute to the actions by the First Army. It can lead to the beginnings of a European defense mechanism, through a joint study of the advance of the French force, its deployment and its role in battle. But does it not by the same token involve France in the strategy of "flexible response," to date rejected, and does it not weaken the consistency of the French concept of deterrence?

Variations on a known theme. While President Mitterrand stated on 26 July 1981 that, in his mind, the decision to build a seventh missile-launching nuclear submarine was made, his prime minister said on 14 December that the principle of this construction was still under study, and on 4 December, his defense minister explained that there would be no seventh submarine before

1994. Sometimes an "antinuclear" inclination emerges in the chief of state. In his speech to the parliament in Copenhagen, when he appointed the head of the Ministry of European Affairs, or when he spoke on the first television network to the signatories of the Appeal of the 100 or the members of the peace movement. And the nuclear "superego" made a forceful reappearance during the televised exercise in education on 16 November 1983: "I am deterrence. Without me, the absolute weapon is powerless." Forgotten were the poverty of the joint program and the rejection of the nuclear strike force, which did not involve "the destruction of existing elements," but only "a production halt!" Buried in a distant past with the vacillations of the first secretary of the Socialist Party, and his proposal on 26 July 1977 that a referendum be held on the maintenance of the deterrent force--condemned by the left wing of the CERES [Center for [Socialist] Studies, Research, and Education], which did not hesitate to denounce "the old leftist tradition of irresponsibility" with regard to military matters. The syndrome of the "Fifth Republic-style chief of state" had struck another blow.

But isn't creativity now to be found in the liberal and Gaullist opposition? Jacques Chirac is shattering the last taboos clouding the European-Atlantic debate. Speaking to the Adenauer Foundation in Bonn on 17 October 1983, he praised the role of the United States in the defense of Western Europe. "The modernization of American nuclear means on our continent would further Washington's commitment." He suggests reflections on the French and British nuclear forces (a theme which was already under discussion, it is true, under the presidency of Pompidou).

"In less than 5 years, with the multiple warheads system, the British and French nuclear forces will have increased considerably. They will represent a deterrent force and capacity which will be truly important and decisive." He rises above the supreme hindrance, "the problem of the direct participation of Germany (in European nuclear deterrence), a problem which exists and must be resolved." Socialist commentary is reserved, as if frozen by the responsibilities of office (or stuck in the conformism of recent converts). Jean-Pierre Chevenement, whose passion for the European identity was unknown, criticizes Jacques Chirac for minimizing the French-British nuclear potential, and suggests that his grand design would not be European, but Atlantic. Our colleague Jacques Huntzinger, promoted to the International Secretariat of the Socialist Party, sets up the commonplaces of the past 20 years--the difficulty of European nuclear defense, the impossibility of the replacement of the United States by France in the nuclear protection of the neighboring countries--as inviolable doctrine, to conclude that the leader of the RPR [Rally for the Republic] is "irresponsible." And Minister of Defense Charles Hernu runs through the primer of the perfect little French strategist of the nuclear era, noting the withdrawal from the integrated military organization and specifying that socialist France will never rejoin the Atlantic apparatus.

III

Short of the impassioned European-Atlantic commitment of the chief of state, uncertainties are mounting as to the French defense capacity, and even the nature of the "French-style Ostpolitik."

Will the Soviet Union, whose military power is at its peak, not be tempted in the 1980s to effect a historic penetration of this Western Europe held at the mercy of its SS-20s? The doubts voiced by the maximalists of nuclear weaponry such as General Gallois concerning the automatic nature of the American nuclear guarantee seemed to be borne out a posteriori. The abrupt statements by Henry Kissinger on 2 and 3 September 1979 during the Georgetown University Strategic Studies Center conference were a revelation to a part of the European political class. The Soviet threat now takes many forms: Can one imagine a classical attack on Western Europe, like those of Generals Close and Hackett, in their war fiction "scenarios"? Isn't the path of classic confrontation the most dangerous, the most seriously risky for the Soviets? Heavy concentrations of Soviet forces would constitute ideal targets for American tactical nuclear weapons. Conventional conflict could lead to a nuclear exchange under the worst conditions for the USSR, while it would be able to eliminate the enemy apparatus at the outset by a surprise nuclear attack--the preemptive nuclear strike dear to Soviet theoreticians. The hypothesis of a nuclear attack which would destroy the combat resources of the enemy "caught by surprise" with ballistic weapons of great accuracy fired from a great distance is thus the most probable. Only then would the advance of classic forces toward the disarmed territories make it possible to establish "desirable" regimes there.

The possibility of a classic attack or an indirect action against Western supply sources, cannot however be excluded altogether. Here the old debate about the realism or lack of it of the "all-or-nothing nuclear war," the strategy of mutual destruction, arises again. Is one assured of safeguarding the integrity of his territory if he has nuclear weapons, but not the conventional weapons necessary for classic battle? In the view of General Lagarde, the "all-or-nothing" nuclear approach would be suicidal. In numerous instances, "France would be particularly happy to have available a conventional military apparatus which would allow it to test the reality of a situation, the reality of the enemy's intentions." And some, such as Jean-Paul Pigasse, according to his statements during the Conference of ENA [National School of Administration] Alumni in June of 1980 on the "threats of war," see in the system of deterrence "a kind of psychological Maginot line" which hardly protects France "but prevents it from thinking." In fact, a concern with "a forceful comeback for conventional weapons" is undeniably to be seen in the present French leaders.

Other psychological and budgetary reasons erode the credibility of deterrence as such. In particular, there is the collapse of the defense spirit, the veritable source of the will to deter: as of May 1980, according to an IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute]-LE POINT poll, 72 percent of French citizens said they were opposed to the use of nuclear weapons. The breadth of mass reaction when it comes to using the nuclear arsenal and the possibility of active disapproval becoming a tidal wave of public opinion should not be ignored, particularly since civil defense and defense of the territory in depth are nonexistent. And above all, will the predictable budget cuts not aggravate the lag which has already occurred in the implementation of the military programming law for the years 1977-1982 and, in the end, reduce our deterrent force below the threshold of credibility? In

socialist France, the advance of the welfare state, and then the economic shipwreck, are pointing toward curtailment of the defense budget. But isn't security the first social service a government is obliged to offer its people --their safety, that is to say their freedom and their survival?

A last unknown factor: the conduct of the statesmen who are sometimes placed at the heads of key ministries, but who are affiliated with the same international political and ideological movement as the virtual enemy: will their reaction be patriotic or partisan? We are familiar with the original aspect of French political life: consensus on matters of defense breaks down only within the presidential majority itself! In the spring of 1983, just after the Williamsburg summit meeting, it was the communist party which was worried about the "Atlantic orientation" of the chiefs of state, and, to the president's crusade for the establishment of the Euromissiles, it was the communist party which attempted to respond by launching a vast pacifist movement in France. Strange games within France, which are incomprehensible to a visitor from Mars, and which are the sole explanation of the giddiness of absolute power, the desire for a cold civil war and the rigidity of our political institutions, when everything would dictate a different coalition! Hasn't the participation of the communists in the executive power had a self-censoring and sweetening effect on the diplomatic activities of France as a whole? The two successive government agreements, although negotiated from a position of strength by the socialists, are distressingly fuzzy where foreign policy is concerned, and a clear retreat from the first of President Mitterrand's ventures. In December 1981, the Polish "test" made it possible to assess the depth of the self-criticism. Didn't the blow struck by the first secretary, General Jaruzelski, constitute the first real test of this "diplomacy of the rights of man" to which the new French leaders proclaimed their devotion? An astonishing compunction! At a time when the most active and representative trade union in Europe had been decapitated, when those basic freedoms which the final Helsinki document made a condition of international legitimacy had disappeared under the leaden seal imposed by the Warsaw junta, Claude Cheysson expressed satisfaction that the matter remained a question "among Poles." Pierre Mauroy held forth in a serious tone about the "state sovereignty" within which "events" were developing. Michel Jobert, who was then a minister, informed us from Moscow of the interest the USSR had in all Warsaw Pact affairs. When all is said and done, did the chief of state use the noble, clear language expected of him? The prime minister immediately noted that "the government plans to remain calm." Has the Socialist Party completed its long march only to produce heralds of nonintervention and a sense of responsibility characterized, for lack of humor, by a seriousness which would have been acceptable to the Norpois of the last century? Is this the definitive conversion to Realpolitik in relations among nations? Or does it mean the primacy of the internal alliance on the dictates of international morality?

Six months later, the technological weapon brandished by the Reagan administration was a further test for the policy of France toward the East. "Reconciliation in Poland has made no progress," the President of the United States said. The measures promulgated on 30 December 1981 were thus made harsher (for a time) on 18 June 1982. This strengthening of the "technological sanctions" against the Soviet Union reopened the debate on the political use of

the economic weapon in East-West relations, and reopened the file on the European-Siberian gas pipeline. For the supporters of East-West cooperation at any price, the embargo is a weapon as ineffective as it is dangerous. It is ineffective because of the autonomy of the military sector within the Soviet economy. It is dangerous because the Soviets would have powerful means of retaliation, first and foremost a possible embargo on repayments (\$65 billion in debts). For the supporters of the sanctions, the basic question does not lie there, but rather in whether the same type of relations should be pursued with a potential enemy as with allies. The American decision on 18 June 1982 was mainly designed to hinder the construction of the Soviet pipeline. It made it possible to raise two real questions beyond the political spectacle which the Versailles summit meeting represented.

1. Can the Western European nations give priority to dissociating economic from political concerns and, in search of immediate gains, continue to engage in keen competition for the winning of Eastern markets, while the Western economies--and technologies--remain interdependent?

2. Has the danger of "Finlandization through gas" been clearly glimpsed? The revelation in the autumn of 1973 of the extreme dependence on states producing raw materials but militarily weak and without world political ambitions might have made European officials fearful about a further dependence, on the Soviet superpower in this case. But this appeal to an examination of conscience on the "policy toward the East" was not supported by the leftist coalition in power in Paris, which preferred to fall back on a chauvinist note justified by wounded dignity and outraged independence.

IV

The rights of the peoples, or political realism? Asserting "his unconditional support" of those fighting for liberty, speaking in Saint-Omer on 20 December 1981, Pierre Mauroy did not fail to denounce the attacks on the rights of man committed in the West, and particularly on the American continent. Like their predecessors, those who are currently governing us thus have indicated their inclination for an apparent East-West symmetry, apparently a guarantee of their objectivity and the breadth of their vision. But are the situations in the East and in the West really symmetrical? And is the conduct of France truly comparable in the two cases?

In Eastern Europe, the issue is the pluralization of power--in the trade union sector, for Poland in 1981, and through the crystallization of factions within the single party and through freedom of expression, in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In Central America, the threat is the emergence of new totalitarian regimes and the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence. Paradoxically, the diplomatic conduct of France was characterized by caution in the first case, and boldness in the second. On 28 August 1981, the Franco-Mexican Declaration on El Salvador described the two rebel movements combatting the junta in power as a "representative political force" and thus "legitimate," and it stressed the "need for basic changes in the social, economic and political realms."

In an international society in constant ferment, it may be useful to note the rise of forces which are not yet of a state or governmental sort. This survey need not be focused only on the state or the government. But why not extend it to the planet as a whole? Can one continue for long to preach the diplomacy of the rights of the peoples in the West, while cozily yielding to the alleged geopolitical constraints in the East?

Here we see the emergence of the Third World orientation of the Socialist Party, and that of the Socialist International as well--that most dignified old lady who, at the end of the 1970s, abandoned her fine 18th-century European style to project her dreams into the "storm sector." But unconditional support of the Third World nations prevents one from seeing their true function. For example, the elegies of Castroism by Jack Lang, which failed to mention any of the basic results of the Cuban achievement (the largest number of political prisoners in Latin America; a bankrupt economy, bodily supported by Soviet aid; and total success on the military level--the strongest military power in Latin America). Or, for example, the salute by Claude Cheysson to Sandinist Nicaragua, and the military aid sought by Charles Hernu for a regime which speedily rejected the "dross" of democratic pluralism to adopt the centralized and militarized Leninist model of government, and to align itself with Soviet diplomacy (even on the Afghan and Polish affairs!).

The truth is that the Third World orientation of the socialist world is, first of all, archaic. When President Mitterrand, in his interview with LE MONDE on 2 July 1981, "voiced serious reservations, not to put it more strongly, about the policy of the United States in Latin America," his reading of Central American developments harked back to the easily analyzed situations in earlier decades--Guatemala in 1954 and Santo Domingo in 1965. In that era, the United States, the sole superpower, gave evidence of real imperialism with regard to simple reform movements in the isthmus and the Caribbean basin. How can one be unaware, 20 years later, that the "rejection of poverty and humiliation" was speedily exploited by other professionals of totalitarianism, skilled in substituting one dictatorship for another (as the Sandinists did, under the approving eye and with the financial aid of the Carter administration)?

The "policy toward the South" of the leftist coalition is, in addition, clumsy. The private "anchorages" it has chosen have led to a phenomenon of rejection in the region: the aid to Hanoi aroused the anger of the dynamic members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The support of the guerrilla forces in El Salvador put the main South American nations on guard. And above all, it lacks creativity. The intervention in Grenada was condemned, as if automatically, while a microgulag in the Caribbean was being developed by a team which had seized power several years earlier by a forceful takeover, and while the inhabitants of the island welcomed the foreign soldiers as liberators. But how could one discern in this case the earlier grip of the international communist movement? It is known that the alliance with the French Communist Party alters the field of vision of the socialist leaders.

Then came an unprecedented challenge, a crisis of a new type which had not been marked out by the resolutions of the International or the statements of

progressive public opinion: the Falklands affair. Without hesitating, Francois Mitterrand closed ranks behind Mrs Thatcher, plunged into the most spontaneous European centrism, and imitated Guy Mollet in Suez. However, from this "committed Third World point of view" which the chief of state claims to embrace, the Argentine thesis on the issue of sovereignty merited contemplation. According to American international law, the boundaries of the Latin American republics are those of the Spanish provinces which they replaced. Now since 1776, the Falkland Islands have been expressly attached to the Buenos Aires district. Beyond that, Argentina in fact occupied the Falklands, taking possession of the islands in 1820, appointing a first governor and granting fishing rights in 1823, and organizing the archipelago politically and militarily in 1829. The true source of the British presence is thus the 1833 act of force--the taking of Port Soledad, which was followed a year later by the occupation of the islands as a whole. Without a doubt, the history of international relations is interwoven with situations involving force of this kind. However, the de facto occupation did not lead here to a process giving rise to the creation of law. The unusually persistent protests by the injured state (Argentina), its refusal to recognize the fait accompli, and its proposals that international arbitration be initiated interrupted "acquisitive prescription" and made the British presence uncontested for the government in Buenos Aires. The "automatic" United Nations majority made no mistake here, reviving the Argentine claim in the past 2 decades as a part of the thrust of its political and almost normative actions in the realm of decolonization. And is this not a "second Suez" (diplomatic) upon which our government leaders have touched? The crisis in the Falklands allowed a Soviet OPA [public offer to purchase] regarding the peoples and governments of Latin America, just as the Suez affair in 1956 led to the entry into the eastern Mediterranean of the USSR with an OPA pertaining to the Arab peoples and governments. Soviet restraint defused this scenario for catastrophe, while the government in Moscow proceeded from abstention during the 3 April 1982 vote to support of Buenos Aires on 27 April. Might one not fear the development of a "Suez number two"? Or a populist Argentine government, which would, out of spite, join in an alliance with Moscow?

The socialist Third World orientation does not preclude commercial realism--even in a sector as heavy with consequences for the vulnerable political regimes of the South as that of weapons sales. It is true that on 5 June 1981, President Mitterrand, during a visit to the Le Bourget air show, asked that the airplanes and helicopters which would be shown him be disarmed. The ultimate affectation for a former humanist opponent! A month later, on 4 July 1981, Claude Cheysson found that "the export of weapons is, both for our defense sector and our industry, a necessity." In a confidential note published by LE MONDE in January 1984, the minister of defense urged a more aggressive marketing policy on the part of his traveling weapons salesmen. There is a legitimate economic concern (even if it goes against the moralizing speeches which characterized the Socialist Party earlier). The French war materiel industry has become extraordinarily dependent on its exports, but the international weapons market cannot be expanded indefinitely. It is near saturation in the zones of tension, and France is coming up against not only competition from the "great powers," but also that of small and medium-sized powers which are proving to be formidable rivals. But how far can this

new commercial realism be carried? How can one view as other than irresponsible the delivery to Iraq of French planes and the equipping of them with missiles--a quasibelligerent act on the side of the nation which began the hostilities in the Gulf war? It may be said with a knowing air that it is not a question of enabling Iraq to win the war, but rather of forcing Iran to make peace. Is this a secondary trick or a real misunderstanding of the nature of the Iranian regime? Socialist France is playing an incendiary role in the Gulf, without having the resources to take action later in a fire-fighting capacity. Moreover, it is altering the credibility of its mission of peace in Lebanon. (In fact, how can it appear neutral and impartial in Beirut, that Near Eastern microcosm which vibrates in tune with the events in the Gulf?)

At the end of the month of March, the Quai d'Orsay organized the French withdrawal...after the collapse of a last illusion: the agreement among the great powers to send an international force to Beirut under UN authority.

Senseless boldness in contrast with equally senseless faintheartedness--but this time in Chad, where the Libyan legions were allowed to return to their quarters to the north of the "red line" and to make the partition of the country a fact.

V

At the heart of Francois Mitterrand's vision of the world is international balance. A convenient concept, it conceals the most widely varied realities. And it is a mysterious concept: it has never been defined by the chiefs of state.

The blessed principle of balance has been used sometimes to halt the ambitions of the virtual enemy, and at others to satisfy it! Its discovery by Francois Mitterrand dates back to the spring of 1978. When questioned about the French intervention in Kolwezi and the affair in Chad, the first secretary of the Socialist Party "found it senseless to threaten the balances in Mediterranean Africa," and he urged dialogue with the Soviet Union and Libya. But is it possible to incorporate the USSR, Cuba and Libya in a modern context of African balance, to subject them to a common behavioral code? Don't the actions of these states on the Black Continent clearly indicate that one is not dealing with moderate powers here?

In the spring of 1981, Francois Mitterrand set himself up in the name of the principle of balance as the champion of the West in the Euromissiles quarrel. It is a question, it is true, of a "balance of forces," which has nothing to do with the "diplomacy of balance," but the two notions are perfectly blended in the statements of the new chief of state. At the time of the first interview the president of the republic had with Chancellor Schmidt, on 24 May 1981, a "total and very clear agreement" was reached: "The balance of forces" was to be reestablished in Europe, and simultaneously, negotiations were to be undertaken with the Soviet Union so that the level of this balance would be as low as possible. Reestablishment of the balance of forces: a concept and problematical complex which was to nurture the debate before the Bundestag on 20 January 1983.

At the United Nations, on 28 September 1983, Francois Mitterrand presented the search for international balance as the axis of any foreign policy:

"Peace among nations cannot endure except on the basis of a real balance. This is the teaching of history." How should the sacrosanct principle be interpreted? Through the concept of support of an international consensus and moderate conduct, the direct derivative of the "Kissinger strategy" of the 1970s? Or through a rally around the vision of self-regulation of the international system by the actor states themselves? Or again, should the policy of balance come down to the international reasons of state?

"It is through respect for this golden rule that the rights of all parties to independence and security are reconciled." Reconciliation of independence and security? The historical untruth here is blatant. Didn't concern for the mysterious European balance transform the diplomacy of the 18th and 19th centuries into a vast realm of intrigue such that the aspirations of the people were scorned? And the contradiction remains cruelly present today, with the peoples of the Old World prevented from choosing their destinies in the name of European security, the modern principle of European balance endorsed in Helsinki!

Should a return to a balanced based on the moderation of the main powers be urged? Our international "concert" is too unequal, with only two irreducible great powers on the political and military chessboard. And the very existence of the central balance mechanism capable of halting the expansion of one power can be challenged. In the 19th century, it was still possible to have recourse to arms against the spoilsport. In the nuclear era, the moment of truth can only be indefinitely delayed, by the very logic of deterrence.

Above all, the political-military chessboard of the 19th century was isolated enough to allow the abstract and disembodied search for a balance among the powers: total separation of foreign and domestic policies, on the one hand, and of economic interplay and diplomatic relations, on the other. In a world in transition, which remains a world in the natural state, with the solitary advance of sovereign political units, but which is also a world with a gradually increasing awareness of the existence of a veritable international community, these conditions are in the process of disappearing. There remains in the presidential statement a curiously "backward" political philosophy, set forth, paradoxically, in the temple of collective security (the United Nations), while in the view of Woodrow Wilson, the societies of nations of the future should have as their basic goal precisely the prohibition of "balance schemes"!

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CSO: 3519/363

JOSPIN ON ARMS SALES, EEC, EUROPEAN DEFENSE, SOVIET RELATIONS

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French Spring 84 pp 41-45

[Interview with Lionel Jospin, first secretary of the French Socialist Party, by Carole Pillon]

[Text] Carole Pillon: Recently, we often hear it said that French foreign policy lacks coherence; that, for example, it talks an Atlantic line while supporting forces in the Third World that are opposing the ideological foundations of the Western camp. What do you think of these criticisms? Does it seem to you that foreign policy is divisible?

Lionel Jospin: The way you have put it seems to me a little unclear. It would be clearer to say that it is the opposition that is talking this way.

If others are going to decide the criterion for coherence, particularly others in the United States, then the logic of our foreign policy is not likely to be apparent. Our policy is not "Atlantic," it is faithful to an alliance that is one of the guarantees of our security. Our policy is not to support the forces "opposing the ideological foundations of the Western camp." It is to remind--in Latin or Central America, for example--that the foundations, ideological or not, of Western civilization are democracy, respect for the human individual, and the course of economic and social progress. When we are in agreement with the United States, we say so. We also say when we are not in agreement.

Foreign policy is not divisible, at least in principles. However, it can and should be differentiated in its application. Otherwise, I do not see how it could "match" the terrain, the complex realities of the present world. In any case, it would be illusory to believe that one can operate in this world on the basis of one or two simple ideas dating from the 1950's.

C. P.: The French policy on arms sales has also been the target of strong criticism and has disillusioned some of those who expected a moralization of international action by the Socialist government. Is economic realism really inescapable in this area?

L. J.: First, we should note that there has been a moralization in regard to a number of countries (South Africa and Chile, for example), with which we have not concluded new contracts. We have also added to the parliamentary information on arms sales to help in clarifying criteria for these sales. That is a good step. Is that enough? Certainly not. However, it is true

that in this unsettled period a number of countries prefer to obtain their defense systems without resorting to the two big powers. It is also true that we have some problems of unemployment and balance of payments. That does not prevent us from stating a position--and I have done so--on one or another arms sale, or from continuing to desire a progressive conversion of arms industries.

C. P.: In your view, was the Western withdrawal from Lebanon a defeat? Has not the credibility of the Western powers been irreparably harmed by this episode?

L. J.: First, we must distinguish between the precipitate departure of the United States and the attitude of France, which, thereby placed in a new situation, took all the time necessary for consultations with its friends--Lebanon, in particular--and for a dignified departure. The French contingent in the Multinational Force had a specific mission that it performed with courage. We assured certain results and are trying to preserve them. However, we cannot serve as a substitute for the Lebanese people's will to live together nor can we shoulder alone the responsibilities of the international community. By demonstrating our commitment to the integrity of Lebanon, by refusing to favor one Lebanese community over others, and by working for international awareness of the importance of a Lebanese equilibrium to equilibrium in the Middle East, France has done its duty. This was an action that, despite the hazards and passions of the moment, does our country credit. I am not sure, in fact, that it was very positive in respect to what you call the "Western world."

C. P.: On a similar note, some are critical of the French Government for having let pass a historic opportunity in Chad by declining to become militarily more active on the side of Hissein Habre. What were France's reasons for not condemning more clearly the Libyan game in Chad?

L. J.: Thus, it would have been a historic opportunity to get our country into a war with Libya? I find that kind of statement somewhat irresponsible. Should we start out by turning Chad into a battlefield between France and Libya? Everyone knows that the primary problem facing that country is its internal struggles, which have never been settled. Never since its independence has Chad been able to establish itself as a state. When Libya tried to use these internal struggles to achieve its expansionist goals, France put a stop to it. Those who made a pathetic departure from N'Djamena in face of the Libyan troops in 1981 should not be giving lessons! No one should have any doubt about France's resolution and firmness in Chad. However, the opportunity to be seized is that of national reconciliation. That is what will avoid partition of the country, and that is what France is working for. Difficult, yes, but in the long term more reliable than any rash military adventure.

C. P.: Until June, France will have primary responsibilities within the EEC. In your opinion, what concrete measures should it propose to "unmire" Europe?

L. J.: The French presidency is already well involved. The president of the Republic has chosen a way to get Europe out of the crisis in which it is struggling.

In view of the danger of contradictory national reactions, it was necessary to remind each of its responsibilities; to both clarify each one's positions, topic by topic, and try to engender a genuine European will. Not bypass the difficulties to be overcome in order to develop a new momentum. And also to demonstrate the European potentials in certain fields (I think of the "Esprit" program, for example; also of the space proposals), if we really do not want to limit ourselves to agricultural policy, important as it is. In this way, a realistic and stimulating dialogue may develop--we must restore confidence in the Community.

As I speak to you, the phase of resolution of the obstacles (agricultural policy, milk and monetary compensatory amounts, budget and British contribution) has not been completed. Reminding the United Kingdom of its duties while recognizing its problems, as far as possible binding the Nine in defense of the Community's basic principles, and demonstrating the urgency of settling the current disputes in order to relaunch European construction (on the social, industrial and technological levels), these are the bases of French policy in this area.

C. P.: What can Europe do in the face of the huge Soviet and American military programs that, 10 years or so from now, could provide the superpowers almost perfect protection? Do you favor a specifically European defense, involving nuclearization of the FRG?

L. J.: Europe's security is a central issue in our future. However, from this viewpoint, Europe does not end with the EEC, which--under its charter--has no military responsibility. Moreover, several of its members do not want it to have any such responsibility. These issues are sufficiently serious so that we should talk about them with precision and without "verbal evasion." It is more important to take action, to create conditions such that when the time comes Europe will be fully capable of assuring its security, rather than to pound on the rostrums talking about European defense, agitating for renovation of the old scarecrows, and in fact proposing an increase in European weapons within the American strategic fold. That is the logic of the proposal by a Jacques Chirac and the French right: a slogan to conceal a political alignment. As for nuclearization of the FRG, I conclude that the FRG is wary of seeking it. Mr Chirac would be well-advised to show the same wisdom as the party primarily involved.

C. P.: What do you think about the idea of a "Finlandization through gas" sometimes referred to by the opponents of the energy agreements with the USSR?

L. J.: I do not think that the idea of "Finlandization by gas" is anything but a slogan. The inter-relations with the Soviet Union can be based on mutual interest. Diversification of our energy sources is no more disadvantageous to us than the trade contracts with that country. There are as many, if not more, uncertainties regarding stability of our supplies from the Middle East. If the USSR one day stopped the supply, that would not present us with energy problems; that would be the sign of something else completely. And perhaps a useful sign. Nothing appears to me more absurd than to strengthen the feeling in the Soviet Union of being a besieged fortress. That benefits neither the movements within the societies of the

Eastern countries--and there are some--nor the chances for peace. Being too fearful of the Soviet Union is one evidence of not having confidence in yourself. And that is not the best way of asserting defense of freedoms and democracy.

C. P.: Does it seem to you opportune to now quickly resume the dialogue with Moscow?

L. J.: The Soviet Union is a decisive actor in today's international life. Just as it is important to clearly tell it what you are thinking and not to yield to its acts of intimidation, so also would it be absurd to consider conducting a foreign policy that rejects all contact with that major country. That is why I believe that now that we are in the post-Pershing period it is important to renew the ties. The Stockholm Conference may contribute to this, even to a modest degree. Let us not neglect it. Other opportunities may present themselves, for example on the bilateral level: let us know enough to take advantage of them.

9920

CSO: 3519/364

BOLKESTEIN SEES TRIP TO PRC AS SUCCESSFUL

The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 1 Jun 84 p 4

[Text] Schiphol, June 1--Foreign Trade Minister Frits Bolkestein returned to the Netherlands yesterday after what he termed a 'successful mission' to the People's Republic of China.

Bolkestein said on arrival at Schiphol airport that economic relations between the two countries had now been restored, as well as diplomatic ones.

Sino/Dutch relations suffered a three-year dispute over supply of Dutch-built submarines to Taiwan, but the Chinese restored relations to full ambassadorial level in February, after the Dutch government refused to grant further export permits for submarines destined for Taiwan.

Bolkestein, though he took with him a top-level delegation of 12 senior civil servants, did not return with definite orders.

Tough

Chinese negotiators were 'obliging, but tough' he said, though orders could follow later in the year.

Doing business with the People's Republic was a question of 'stamina, patience and financial elbow-room.' Nevertheless, he had won a promise that the Netherlands, in view of the fact that Sino/Dutch trade had fallen behind that of other countries, would be given advantageous treatment, he said.

The Chinese had expressed interest in Dutch expertise in the fields of port development, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture and fertilisers, but Dutch industries would have to come up with competitive tenders, he said.

CSO: 3600/37

POLL RESULTS ON RELATIVE POSITION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 1-7 Jun 84 p 8

[Article by Jose Silva Pinto]

[Text] Within the current party framework, if parliamentary elections were held today, the PS/PSD [Socialist Party/Social Democratic Party] majority would not be challenged, but this would not be the case if a new "Eanist" party were to compete in the elections; its "score" would be very similar to that of each of the two parties in the Central Bloc (about 21/22 percent).

This at least is the conclusion that can be drawn from a special analysis of the results of successive polls of the electorate, conducted between January and May of this year by O JORNAL, in collaboration with Marktest.

Although the survey is only representative of the urban electorate, involving a total of 2,500 eligible voters residing in urban centers with more than 10,000 inhabitants, the stability of some data permits them to be considered valid for the electorate as a whole.

One of these measures--say the Marktest experts, who analyzed the sample on a cumulative basis, which allows them to obtain results of high statistical accuracy--is the switch of votes by a particular electorate, from which it is possible to establish the matrices represented in Tables I and III.

Table I depicts precisely the matrix of the foreseeable switch in votes if parliamentary elections were held now, with the present political parties competing in them.

Thus, if the voters went to the polls today, the APU [United People's Alliance] and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] would hold on to most of their 1983 voters (88 and 87 percent, respectively). The CDS would even lure away an appreciable slice of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] electorate (1 percent), while the APU would "seduce" 4 percent of those who previously voted for the PS [Socialist Party].

This is shown in Table I, which also indicates that 19 percent of those who voted for the PS in 1983 would now abstain, a position that would be maintained by 60 percent of those who abstained in the April 1983 elections.

From the matrix depicted in Table I, projecting the behavior of the electorate based on the actual vote in 1983, it can be ascertained with some certainty how the existing parties would fare in the overall vote.

The results of this projection are clear in Table II, in which are recorded the votes cast last year and what should occur today.

Thus the PS (-4.8 percentage points) and the PSD (-2.3 percent) would lose votes to the APU (+ 1.9), the CDS (+ 2.9) and others (+ 2.0), whereas the abstentions and blank votes would increase by 0.7 percent. Meanwhile, the coalition now in power would still hold 57.9 percent of the votes cast.

Regarding the APU, it would succeed in breaking the 20-percent barrier, gaining 2.1 [sic]points, but the major gain would be won by the CDS (+ 2.9 points).

"Bloodletting" of PS and APU

If a party sponsored by General Eanes were to compete, what results could be expected? As in the procedure with the existing parties, the application of a simulation model permits a determination of a matrix of the transfer of votes, reproduced in Table III.

The most obvious finding is that the appearance of an "Eanist" party would have the greatest effect on the PS, which would lose more than half its voters, and would only secure 48 percent of the votes it won in 1983, but the APU and the PSD would also suffer a major "bloodletting."

Only 66 percent of the APU voters would remain faithful to the coalition of the "hoops" and only 68 percent of those who voted for the PSD in last year's election would continue to opt for the "orange party."

According to the available data, the "Eanist" party electorate would be constituted at the cost of 32 percent of the former PS adherents and 29 percent of the former APU supporters, while the PSD would contribute only 6 percent of its own electorate. However, 10 percent of those who voted with the PSD in 1983 would go over to the CDS, which is, incidentally, the only party whose electorate would remain almost completely loyal, barely affected by the appearance of the new party.

Except for the CDS, which might even profit in the "deal," all the current parliamentary parties would lose more or less significant segments of support to the new party, while the percentage of abstentions would drop noticeably, from 24.2 percent to 19.3 percent.

As Table IV shows, there would be an appreciable change in the electoral picture, with the PSD, the PS and the "Eanist" party achieving very similar "scores," on the order of 21/22 percent.

Within the present political framework, the PS and PSD together would still win 57.9 percent of the votes.

Table I: Transfers of Votes by Party

Of those who voted in 1983 for:	<u>They would now vote for:</u>						<u>No Vote</u>	<u>Total (percent)</u>
	<u>Party</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>PSD</u>	<u>APU</u>	<u>CDS</u>	<u>Other</u>		
	PS	72	1	4	1	3	19	100
	PSD	2	77	-	7	5	9	100
	APU	1	1	88	-	1	9	100
	CDS	1	1	1	87	-	10	100
	Other	3	5	-	-	62	30	100
	No Vote	13	10	7	7	3	60	100

Table II: Percentage of Votes Cast for Party

<u>Party</u>	<u>In 1983</u>	<u>Today</u>
PS	37.1	32.3
PSD	27.9	25.6
APU	18.6	20.5
CDS	12.9	15.8
Other	3.5	5.8
Abstentions	24.2	24.9

"Fanist" party would "pulverize" PSD, but would only take 22.1 percent of the votes.

Table III: Transfers of Votes by Party if "Fanist" Party Were Included

Of those who voted in 1983 for:	<u>They would now vote for:</u>							<u>Total</u>
	<u>Party</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>PSD</u>	<u>APU</u>	<u>CDS</u>	<u>"Fanist"</u>	<u>Other</u>	
	PS	48	2	4	2	32	-	100
	PSD	-	69	1	10	6	2	100
	APU	-	-	66	-	29	-	100
	CDS	5	-	3	86	-	-	100
	Other	4	32	26	-	24	-	100
	Abstain	14	9	7	7	12	4	100

Table IV: Percentage of Votes Cast for Party

<u>Party</u>	<u>In 1983</u>	<u>Today</u>
PS	37.1	21.7
PSD	27.9	22.4
APU	18.6	16.2
CDS	12.9	15.6
"Fanist"		
Party	-	22.1
Other	3.5	2.0
No Vote	24.2	19.3

The results now forecast for a possible Fanist party are much less favorable than those observed in polls taken 1 or 2 years ago, when much higher scores could be foreseen than those projected today.

In February 1983, a Marktest/O JOURNAL poll showed that the appearance of a new party "seen as close to the president of the republic" could potentially take 59 percent of all the votes cast. The survey showed that 32 percent of the electorate would certainly have voted for such a party, while 29.4 percent might have voted for it and 24.6 percent declared that they would certainly not vote for an Fanist party.

6362

CSO: 3542/47

POLL SHOWS RISING POPULARITY OF PINTASILGO

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 1-7 Jun 84 p 9

[Article by H.M.]

[Text] The month of May saw a rise in the popularity of Lurdes Pintasilgo and a decline in that of Mario Soares, who reached his lowest point, falling behind Mota Amaral, Lucas Pires and Freitas do Amaral, reveals a Marktest/O JORNAL poll taken last month.

Gaining two points, former Prime Minister Pintasilgo remained well ahead on the popularity list, even increasing her advantage over the other political figures. Lurdes Pintasilgo failed to gain in popularity only among voters in the north (whose first choice is the Azorian leader in Porto (Freitas do Amaral) and, naturally, of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] (also Mota Amaral) and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] (Lucas Pires and Freitas do Amaral). Otherwise, both in the APU [United People's Alliance], where she surpassed Cunhal, and in the PS [Socialist Party], Pintasilgo is unquestionably first.

Mota Amaral (who gained three points in relation to April), Lucas Pires (who gained four) and Freitas (two more points) surpassed Mario Soares, who went down two points in relation to April and seven points in relation to his January "score."

Mota Pinto and Alvaro Cunhal also declined, respectively, one and two points.

Other figures often mentioned, although they were not on the list, were Zita Seabra (6 percent), Jaime Gama, Vitor Constancio and Alberto Joao Jardim (all 13 percent).

The "balance" between positive and negative image was only positive in the case of Lurdes Pintasilgo, the most negative results falling to the leaders of the four major parties: Lucas Pires, Mario Soares, Mota Pinto and, at the bottom of the list, Alvaro Cunhal.

Incidentally, Cunhal remains the leader with the most eroded image. With the exception of voters between 25 and 34 years of age and followers of the APU and Eanes, who gave this "award" to Mota Pinto, the secretary general of the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] heads the list, with the most negative image in all areas, ages groups and political spectra.

POLL POINTS TO EROSION OF FANES IMAGE DESPITE POPULARITY

Lisbon O JOURNAL in Portuguese 1-7 Jun 84 p 9

[Article by H.M.]

[Text] The president of the republic has not escaped the erosion which the more familiar government bodies have been experiencing, although he continues to be the most "beloved," by far. It is significant that the number of people with no opinion on the activity of the president, the government and the parliament has grown considerably.

With the best image among the electorate, the president of the republic is particularly popular in the Porto region and among the PS [Socialist Party] electorate, while his lowest popularity ratings come in the southern region and in the PSD [Social Democratic Party] and CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] electorates.

The government is, in contrast, the sovereign organ which received the least favorable opinions among all those polled. Oddly, whereas those who voted for the PS in 1983 and those who voted for Fanes in the 1980 presidential election look most kindly on the Executive, the citizens of Greater Porto, APU adherents and--perhaps surprisingly--PSD voters are particularly critical. In fact, only 2.7 percent of the Social Democrats polled felt the government had a "good image."

Regarding the Assembly of the Republic, its image remains practically unchanged from previous months, with a popularity rating equal to that of the government, although it received less criticism than the executive branch. [Sentence as published].

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CSO: 3542/47

EANES, FOR AND AGAINST: PERSONALITIES LIST

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 Jun 84 pp 14-16R

[Article by Joao Carreira Bom: "Eanistas: Those Who Are and Those Who Were"]

[Text] One of the strange phenomena in Portuguese political activity during the past 8 years has been the fluctuations in the devotion and hostility (both quite intense) that President Eanes has aroused, sometimes with 180° shifts, among backers and opponents. The evolution of the political process between 1976 and 1980, the thwarting of consecutive hopes and the advent of others of a contrary nature regarding the presidentialism embodied by Eanes partially explain this spectacular change of moods. But there are certainly reasons here and there (of a psychological and even psychoanalytical nature) that have contributed to this. At a time when there is again talk of the launching of a political force inspired by Eanes, this is a brief "dictionary" (which is not meant to be exhaustive) of the loyalties and "disloyalties" that the current President of the Republic has polarized during the course of his two terms in office.

Aguiar, Joaquim. After having served as Pinheiro de Azevedo's technocratic shadow, he became that of Eanes. The young "politologue" has been the adviser who has most influenced the president's speech during both terms.

Almeida Costa. The Macao government may have been a reward for the fact that, in 1980, he was one of the first to back the second candidacy of the PR when, 4 years earlier, the admiral himself had ambitions for the seat in Belem. In fact, until the Sa Carneiro government, he maintained a certain amount of political aloofness from Ramalho Eanes.

Alves, Vitor. The position of political counselor (not to be confused with that of adviser) has given him some influence. He has proven to have a great many uses (specifically, that of serving as a lid, as in the argument over the emigrant communities).

Amaro da Costa. He was the first politician in the AD [Democratic Alliance] parties to enunciate the reasons for the necessary "clash" with the system represented by Eanes, whose personality, even at times of tactical convergence, never evoked his enthusiasm. His status as a civilian did not prevent him from

lengthening this distance kept from the Armed Forces model of organization. He upheld the medium term reconversion of the structures in effect, coordinating them with economic goals in the fishing area. This would evoke some excitement among the ruling sector (the Army), in which most of the offers backing the PR were located.

Advisers. The president likes to listen to them. And less according to his own comments than from the tone of the "briefing," he sometimes leaves them with the notion that he is going to make a decision in one direction, and later surprises them with the opposite choice.

Locals. The obsession with the second term has already brought results through Mendes da Silva and many others. As was noted in EXPRESSO's "document" 3 weeks ago, Eanes is now in the phase of reaping dividends, after having cultivated them in consecutive speeches, not only throughout this country, but also (with almost ridiculous exaggeration) in official addresses abroad.

Aventino Teixeira. The most "anarchic" of the colonels did not succeed in saving the infantryman Ribeiro Santos, although he continues to be a weekly visitor to the president's Spartan table, confirming the presence of this "record" with bad implications for Mario Soares.

Azeredo Perdigao. Discreet until the advent of the CNARPE [Eanista party], the number one man at the Gulbenkian was an essential backer in 1980. Next year, if Eanes does not opt for very active political participation, he may render him another inestimable service: appointing him his successor in the Foundation.

Barreto, Antonio. A "presidentialist" who never exulted over Eanes personally, unlike Medeiros Ferreira, his partner in the dismissal of the PS [Socialist Party], in the preparation of the Reform Manifesto, and, in 1979, in the agreement with Sa Carneiro. He was not present at the "presidential" meeting at Rio Maior during the same year, but did participate in the one at Mateus (which was apparently more productive than the former). Overly ambitious to join "charismatic" movements, noting the fact that the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], after the "Barreto into the street" of 1976, recovered some objectives of its agricultural legislation, while politicians from the coalition consider it "statist," forgetting his hardline positions as a Communist militant (before 1974), the former agriculture minister is gaining readers in cooperation with the press and is cultivating his own profile of a PR for the 1990's.

Barros, Henrique. Among those who do not forgive him for leaving the PS, there are some who describe him as "leader of the rheumatic presidential brigade"; an assertion which, with its lack of subtlety, does not fail to reflect the interest with which Eanes listens to this retired professor of agronomy.

Bernardo. The lieutenant colonel responsible for intelligence and security at Belem. His tenure in the judiciary (assistant director until 1979) has

enabled him to gain a certain amount of experience and contacts, which could be used in new political undertakings.

Botequilha, Joao. Viewed by some "Eanista" circles as having been among the "slow ones" regarding the formation of the party, this manager was cited in the press about 6 years ago in the capacity of a member of a group of specialists of whom the PR requested opinions regarding economic matters. He later devised a plan for reorganizing the presidential services, the governmental unfeasibility of which was one of the two personal reasons for Eanes' complaint about the executive branch (the other was the 61-conto salary). He showed up, in force, in the CNARPE, after June 1980.

Caetano, Miguel. Another manager to whom the president is indebted for good service. He is the son of Marcelo Caetano, and his collaboration dates back to the first term.

Caldas, Julio Castro. Before Henrique Granadeiro and after Carlos Macedo, he was one of the three "president's men" (later affiliated with AD) who left Belem during the previous term for political reasons.

Casqueiro, Jose Manuel. He was an enthusiast for Eanista presidentialism until the meeting in Rio Maior (from which he returned disappointed), moving to a fierce opposition at the time of the Pintasilgo government. He broke what might be called the "code of the political group," disclosing details of talks with the PR in this area at the time.

Cardoso, Pedro. Although there are some who cite Eanes' praise for the behavior of the former Army chief of staff, according to other sources, however, the general's transfer to Brussels after the president's reelection must have been a result of his unexpected critical tone concerning Soares Carneiro's adversary.

CNARPE. As in the case of the CDE [Democratic Electoral Commission] and the MFA [Armed Forces Movement], one can talk about several CNARPEs. There was at least the phase one CNARPE (until June 1980); there was the one of the campaign; and now there is the one resulting from the transformation of all this. What exists may still be far removed from the National Commission to Support the Reelection of President Eanes, but it certainly reflects the effects of its "holding" style operation.

Correia, Natalia. She listened to many complaints in 1975 from members of the "group of nine" and, the following year, was one of the few writers who were not ashamed to back the candidacy of the "dark-eyed man"; in 1978, she joined the PSD [Social Democratic Party] when Sa Carneiro was considering a "central bloc" with Eanes; she was horrified at the possibility of Soares Carneiro; she ended up leaving Buenos Aires. She is a member of the News Media Council, at the proposal of the PS; but she is still one of the usual guests at the president's frugal table.

Costa Bras. After having experienced a certain amount of friction with Soares (in 1977), he reappeared in the Pintasilgo government; last year becoming slightly aloof from Belem and accepting a position with the High Authority Against Corruption. It is said that this is due to the fact that some of his friends want to launch him in the presidential elections.

Eanes, Manuela. A presence that is not always discreet, but dedicated. Attesting to her political influence, it was ironically claimed in party circles recently that the best candidate backing the PR, after himself, would be Manuela Eanes.

Economists. Jacinto Nunes and Silva Lopes are some of the specialists that the president usually invites to Belem, where many others have been, starting with the group consulted in 1978 which included, in addition to Botequilha, Miguel Caetano and Silva Lopes, Manuela Silva and Joao Salgueiro.

Business Owners. The CIP [Confederation of Portuguese Industrialists] was always the confederation which was most critical, months ago, of the failed notion of the Council for Social Harmony. Eanes managed to seat at the same table representatives of management and of the CGTP [General Federation of Portuguese Workers]. Included among the business owners who appreciate his invitations (not counting Rocha de Matos and the unfailing Jorge Figueiredo) are Manuel Goncalves and Joao Rocha.

Former Secretariat. Important to the 1980 reelection, this divided group (so much accused of Eanism) was never clear about its position, as a group, on the issue of the "presidential party."

Firmino Miguel. When the CNARPE came into existence, his apparent dissociation from Eanes was not much approved. However, the relations between the two remain cordial, as proven by the fact that Firmino Miguel still participates in the monthly banquets that bring together former comrades from the Military Academy: Eanes, Rocha Vieira, Barroco, Bernardo, Garcia dos Santos, Hugo dos Santos and Mario Beirao.

Freitas do Amaral. As might happen now, he had (until the presidential governments) tactical rapprochement with the PR in the institutional realm, although Ramalho Eanes personally caused him apprehension and perplexity at times, after the hopes placed in him by the CDS in 1976.

Garcia dos Santos. The dismissal of the former Army chief of staff, under the circumstances in which it happened, has not sufficed to interrupt a close, long-standing cooperation.

Granadeiro, Henrique. The former chief of the Civilian Household (currently a member of the PSD) was Eanes' chief backer during the first months of the previous term. A more clearcut presidential intervention was appearing, which could take place through the leadership of a PS-PSD bloc. A member of the "right of center," he departed when he realized the impossibility of eliminating the PR's attraction to the "left of center," which materialized in a greater heed for the ideas of Melo Antunes, specifically on foreign policy.

Intellectuals. In 1976, they fled from the headquarters of the candidacy like the devil from the cross. Four years later, they were rushing around the unfinished building where the CNARPE was operating.

Jurists. Miguel Galvao Teles and Figueiredo Dias, brought by the PR from the Constitutional Commission to the Council of State, obviously have the president's confidence, and to a certain extent the same thing might even be said about Jorge Miranda, among others.

Lemos Ferreira. He backed Eanes until the Pintasilgo government, while some of the collaborators of the then Air Force chief were grooming him as the next presidential candidate. Upon the advent of AD, he was seen more often in the office of the defense minister.

Letria, Joaquim. Invited by Eanes to participate in the 1976 campaign, he refused, so as not to compromise O JORNAL, of which he was editor. He even gained the reputation of being an Otelista on the team of the then future PR, whom his televised image helped 4 years later.

Loureiro dos Santos. An unfailing one; in the Mota Pinto government he was the "link" at the Rio Maior meeting. Later, he played an identical role at the Mateus estate, but with better results; at least the embryo of the "intellectual CNARPE" came into being there.

Lucas Pires. Whereas Frietas do Amaral's rapprochement with the PR occurred in the institutional realm, that of the current centrist leader has always taken place from a personal standpoint: understanding and benevolent criticism.

Lucena, Manuel. Until 1979, this former exile (in Italy) was bent, as few others were, on presidentialism (with Eanes), later yielding to the "elan" of AD and now theorizing about the hardship of a lack of a plan.

Macedo, Carlos. The only adviser who came out making appeals (Castro Caldas would have been more moderate). He saw in the resident of Belem the future leader of "a National Union painted red." This was when Sa Carneiro still had some doubts about the PR.

Machado, Alberto. The adviser for social affairs is a man with Christian Democratic training and an expert in education, like Manuela Eanes, and an ultra-montane, like Adriano Moreira.

Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa. Never having been a visitor to Belem, nevertheless, he did stand out as a backer of reinforcement for the president's intervention during the initial phase of Eanes' first term, cultivating the latter's image sympathetically during that period. Throughout the experience of the governments based on presidential initiative, he gradually became dissociated from those positions, until 1980, when he assumed a critical stance which was particularly virulent against Eanism and the person of Eanes.

Martinho, Herminio. The main instigator of the present pro-party movement discloses one odd trait: Without being a local, he nevertheless belongs to the local notables that the PR, in the scores of visits to the provinces, managed to captivate. They are business leaders; they are small and medium-sized business owners; they are the "entrepreneurs" mentioned in the president's speeches, arranged for the purpose of reaching the "real country" and its active figures: unknown in Lisbon, but who, at first sight, have not yet been sullied by the vices of the "political group."

Medeiros Ferreira. If, at any time since 1976, he was far from Belem (there were some who never let themselves be convinced by the agreement with Sa Carneiro), the former minister of foreign affairs immediately returned, and with what energy! He influenced the "substratum" of several presidential addresses.

Melo Antunes. One of the figures who has most influenced the present Portuguese political system, he was nevertheless made obscure in Belem during the first half of the former term. He started to be heeded more when Henrique Grana-deiro left. This coincided with the heightening of the president's interest in African affairs. The visits by the lieutenant colonel, up until then virtually at his own initiative, started having the features of parallel diplomacy.

Mendes, Clara. Very active in the CNARPE and, later, together with Sousa e Castro and Carlos Lilaia, at the Damiao de Gois Institute, this instructor from the School of Architecture, who used to meet weekly with the PR, now appears to be engaged exclusively in her teaching profession.

Military. The high point of the military influence on Ramalho Eanes came between 1976 and 1978, yet it had an effect on 25 November. Since then, there have been several fluctuations. In this respect, the Sa Carneiro term in government may be typified as the worst for the general. Some sources think that, now, despite the fact that his most secure backers belonged to a 25 April Association made up of military from the left of center and from the PCP area, the former CEMGFA [Armed Forces Chief of Staff] might regain the support of other sectors if he should again play a more active role in the political process. However, it should be recalled that the "anti-Eanistas" began gaining strength in the barracks just when the president seized the initiative to form governments.

Mota Amaral. The most recent visit by the head of state to the Azores may have dispelled any ambiguity about the Social Democratic governor's cooperation, but did not dispel all of them: Both realize (each in his own way) that political journeys only occur in a straight line when necessary.

Mota Pinto. He was minister of commerce in Mario Soares' cabinet after having left the PSD in Aveiro. With the PS on a war footing against Eanes, he formed the second presidential executive body, at a time when the meeting at Rio Maior was taking place and while Sousa Franco Magalhaes Mota and scores of other Social Democratic deputies were leaving the PSD; and the then prime minister publicly admitted the need for a new party. Months after having

caused indignation in Buenos Aires, he emerged as Soares Carneiro's national representative, and returned to the PSD, joining Mario Soares again.

Neves, Jaime. A fierce backer of Eanes until the afternoon of 25 November, the former commando chief gradually became dissociated after Melo Antunes, on that date, maintained that the PCP should retain its legal status. Whereas his animosity reached its peak at the time of the Sa Carneiro government, in a recent interview with SEMANARIO it was noted that the tone of his criticism had declined.

Nobre da Costa. Along with Lourdes Pintasilgo, he is the most prominent figure among the "independents" who have collaborated with the PR. So, last year, when (in statements made to EXPRESSO) he expressed skepticism regarding a new party, the predictions among political circles immediately started depicting "Eanism" as having its days numbered. He considers the labor legislation in force an obstacle to the running of business firms, and must not be very pleased with the "left-oriented populism" that motivates several of the president's backers.

Workers. They are not among the regular guests at Belem (except when they are members of CGTP delegations); but Eanes has been accustomed to spending New Year's with them. In 1976, when it was divided between Otelo and Pato, the proletariat, under Communist influence, was far removed from imagining that, 4 years later, it would be reunified to reelect the "Pinochet" who was to liquidate the revolution on 25 November.

Palma Carlos, Adelino. Another unfailing one, and also proof that the generation between 65 and 80 is counting on Eanes.

Pimentel. The lieutenant-colonel who headed the cabinet also left during the first term, but for reasons different from those of Macedo, Caldas and Granadeiro. He is very loyal to the PR, and such a friend of Loureiro dos Santos that (in military circles) both are known as "Dupont and Dupont."

Pintasilgo, Lourdes. Appearing in several polls with a popularity index far exceeding that of Soares, the former governor (beyond the contradictions with other sectors of the CNARPE) may have given some encouragement to many of those who, even a few months ago, considered an alternative to the "central bloc" virtually unthinkable.

Pinto Balsemao. In the realm of the institutions, he now appears less distant from the "presidential figure" as it has been described in the recent talks in Braga and Sedes. His remarks have been "swallowed" at Belem nearly 2 years after, as prime minister, he had headed with the PR the most ridiculous side of the institutional war: the voluntary taping of the talks between the two.

Proenca de Carvalho. Another of those who changed drastically between 1976 and 1978, to engage in a militant effort for the exclusion of Eanes, as president of RTP [Portuguese Radio-Television System].

Rabaca, Jose. At present, he may not be among the most influential figures insofar as the new party is concerned; but no one is in a position to claim that (at least in the press) he has been among the least active. He was already "fast" when the "slow ones" were in the majority.

Ramos, Antonio. The PR's eyes and ears in Parliament.

Reino, Fernando. He left as chief of the Civilian Household nearly 2 years ago, to continue his diplomatic career as ambassador to the UN in Geneva. The stay in Belem was a failed "bridge" to an understanding with Soares (whose friend he also is).

Rocha, Hugo. From being chief of staff of the PSP during the "hot summer," he became undersecretary of state for internal administration, maintaining some proximity to the presidential area until the Pintasilgo government. Since the time of Amaro da Costa he has been the defense minister's office chief.

Rego, Vitor Cunha. A scorekeeper for Eanes' candidacy in 1976, he also served in that capacity 4 years later for that of Soares Carneiro. In the meantime, there occurred the dissociation from Soares (whose assistant secretary of state he was). The dissent with Eanes was more gradual and influenced by the advent of AD in 1979.

Rocha Vieira. The fact that he maintains cordial relations with the PR has become insufficient to warrant the claim that his political relations have a proximity identical to that noted when Eanes named his Army chief of staff and promoted him to general. The conflict that he waged over the dismissal of Vasco Lourenco, then military governor of Lisbon, may have been the deciding factor.

Sa Carneiro. In 1976, he was the first political leader to publicly back the Eanes candidacy. The last illusions of the Social Democratic leader vanished 3 years later and, months thereafter, when AD was formed, he described the system represented by the PR as a leading adversary.

Santos, Hugo. After having left the command of the Central Military Region nearly 6 years ago, he had differences with Eanes and Garcia dos Santos over military affairs, and assumed the status of being "on leave without pay." Since 1980, he has apparently assumed a discreet support, of the "yes, but" sort.

Seabra, Jose Augusto. Through the Independent Civic Commission, he upheld a pro-presidentialist line in 1979.

Silva Costa. The efficient organizer of the press services during the first term, when the PR was the "man who never laughs."

Silva Horta. According to some detractors, his support for the president began at social-type meetings with Manuela Eanes and the admiral's wife. As chief of the Military Household, he is a presence as discreet as it is influential.

Silva Pinto. A former Marcelista minister whom the PR ordered to come from abroad. The undertaking apparently proved useful (the same thing might be said regarding Jose Luis Sapateiro).

Soares Louro. If, some day, he has to appoint someone to direct television, Eanes will have no problems finding an expert. The former president of RTP is among those who have backed him since 1976.

Soares, Mario. 1978 was a decisive year in the Socialist leader's political career. He never forgave his candidate of 1976 for dismissing the Second Constitutional Government. One of his present goals is to accomplish what Sa Carneiro could not: defeat Ramalho Eanes irrevocably.

Sousa e Castro. A loyal, assiduous presence at the Damiao de Gois Institute, he nevertheless continues to be viewed with skepticism by other presidential collaborators.

Sousa Leitao. He is the only military chief still serving in the office for which he was selected by Eanes. However, in Navy circles close to the PR, it has been commented that the admiral has not provided the political backing that he should for the reelection of the man who made him head of the Navy.

Tome Pinto. The career of the GNR [Republican National Guard] commander included the post of chief of staff of the military commander of Lisbon, Vasco Lourenco; however, he kept a certain distance from Eanes when the CNARPE came into existence.

Torga, Miguel. Friends of the writer in Coimbra say that Eanes is the only politician that he respects. At least one thing is true: the attention has been reciprocated.

Vasco da Gama Fernandez. Acting president of the republic during the chief of state's absence abroad, he presided over the Council of the Revolution which promoted Eanes to the rank of general.

Vasco Lourenco. An active supporter in the 25 April Association. Soares went to far as to invite him to be a presidential candidate in 1980; and, at a recent luncheon with EXPRESSO, Vasco Lourenco commented: "It was not in my cards to run as a candidate for the PR that year."

Vasco Pulido Valente. He is acceptable for having drafted the speech of 25 April 1978 in which Eanes demarcated himself from the government for the first time. His recent series of articles in DIARIO DE NOTICIAS has been carefully analyzed in Belem, in the manner of one who is saying: "Come back, Vasco, you are forgiven." There are even rumors that the former Socialist and former Social Democrat would like Melo Antunes to agree to be a candidate in the presidential elections (obviously, with Ramalho Eanes' backing).

Vasconcelos, Jose Carlos. Another unfailing one, except for his criticism of the dismissal of Soares in 1978. He and Alvaro Guerra were among the few authors who participated in the PR's campaign in 1976.

Zenha, Salgado. Eight years ago, when he opted for a civilian candidate, no one would have said that Eanes would rank between him and Mario Soares. In fact, some of the parliamentary speeches in which the PS most demarcated itself from the PR belonged to Francisco Salgado Zenha.

2909

CSO: 3542/57

COMMENT PLACES PUJOL CASE IN POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

Madrid ABC in Spanish 28 May 84 p 15

[Text] What we call the "Pujol mistake" (for the government's decision creates additional risks for national unity at the height of the autonomy crisis) has produced violent political reactions. Political figures such as Miguel Roca, who until now have been appreciably moderate in their criticism of the government, are getting tough: "It is a matter of the utmost urgency to get these gentlemen removed from the government," says the spokesman of the Catalan minority in the Congress.

This is the first time since the elections of 1982 that the pressing urgency to replace the socialists has been recognized. It is a novelty of major importance, although quite to the contrary, there is nothing new about the reiterations of points of view from which only the perpetuation or the all but indefinite continuance of the socialists in government can be foreseen.

Although the "Pujol mistake" was made by the government has its home base in Catalonia, its results are not a Catalan problem alone, but create as well a national problem of extreme proportions.

The offense committed by the government against the Catalans is also an offense suffered by all other Spaniards in general. It is a government empowered by the mandate of the Spanish people that has inflicted damage on something that goes beyond what is represented by the feeling of Catalans about autonomy. It is not the integrity of Mr Pujol that is at stake. What has been opened to question is the democratic integrity of the government.

A sudden action of the socialists against Catalan nationalism is sure to provoke a response in opposition to socialism from the Catalan nationalists, but this response from the Catalans does not mean that there will be no stern reaction from the other political forces, nor should that response lay its bets on formulas anticipating the breakup of the non-leftist voting bloc. The breach in this non-socialist electoral front would lead to the continuance of socialism in government. Too much stress should not be placed on the factors represented by the internal differences in the nonsocialist world, but rather on the motives and

reasons for the decisions shared therein. It is time to concentrate on the common denominators regardless of the extent to which the identity of each numerator is or is not preserved. And all the more so the urgent need for political change is insisted upon.

If all the votes cast for the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] in 1982 did not come from the Left, neither would all the votes that might defeat socialism in 1985 or 1986 necessarily have to come from the Right. For this reason, the problems of individual identity as a group, as a force or as a camp should never be given precedence over questions about the united action that will capture the vote the advantage of the Center and the Right.

Finally, we understand the statement that "it is a matter of the utmost urgency to get these gentlemen removed from the government," but in our opinion, no irrelevant discussions should be undertaken about what the Right is and what the Center is, when we know that the Center is the main contribution of the Right to political moderation. As for the rest, what is needed is a great respect for Spain from all the autonomies.

8089

CSO: 3548/264

FORMATION, COURTING OF GALICIAN POLITICAL COALITION

Madrid YA in Spanish 28 May 84 p 6

[Article by Felix Blanco: "Roca Invites Galician Coalition to Merge with 'Reformists'"]

[Text] Vigo -- With harsh criticism for traditional Galicianists, whom he accused of mere theorizing about nationalism and of not setting out on the rougher and more difficult road of putting theory into practice and assembling the political party that will answer the demands of the majority of Galician society, Jose Rodriguez Pena, secretary general elect, closed the constituent convention of the Galician Coalition, which was held over the week end in the installations of the Mercantile Center of Vigo.

The Galician Coalition is the result of the fusion of four political groups, some having an old tradition, such as the Galicianists, and others recently born of the bankruptcy of the UCD [Democratic Center Union] in Galicia, such as the Independent Galician Party (PGI) of Jose Luis Meilan Gil, with headquarters in La Coruna; the Centrists of Orense (CO) under the forceful leadership of Eulogio Gomez Franqueira, and the Convergence of Independents of Galicia (CIC), located mainly in Pontevedra.

The political entity that has taken shape under the name of the Galician coalition describes itself as a political organization of the Galician people set up as an instrument with which to affirm the status of Galicia as representative of an historic nationality and to further the latter's cultural economic and social development, with the desire to participate as well in the generous political activity of Spain.

This expressed desire to participate in politics on the national level was the reason for the presence of Miguel Roca Junyent, who in his address to more than 1,500 persons attending the convention, invited the Galician Coalition to take part in a political project converging from the periphery toward the center, for the purpose of offering the Spanish electorate a distinct and powerful bipartisan alternative that will confront two contenders who are forgetting to solve the great problems of Spanish society and are wrangling among themselves.

Roca, Star Performer

There is no doubt that Miguel Roca was the star of the guests at the convention, among whom were Jeronimo Alberti of the Union Party of Majorca and chairman of the Balearic Islands Council; Luis Marin Sicilia, vice-chairman of the Andalusian Parliament, who is involved in Miguel Roca's reformist operation; Manuel Nunez, former minister of Health and former organizational secretary of the Democratic Center Union, who asked for permission to attend the convention as an observer, and representatives of the Center and Reformist parties of La Rioja and Asturias, respectively.

The convention opened at noon on Saturday. The several work committees prepared the chairman's reports, which were discussed in a joint session held in the afternoon and evening, during which it was agreed to hold the reports in abeyance until the contributions of the new members are collected at some time in the near future. On the second and final day of the convention, the executive committee, consisting of 25 members, was elected and was presented with a single membership list headed by the chairman, Antonio Diaz Fuentes, until now chairman of the managing committee; Uwaldo Atanes Romero, first vice-chairman, until now secretary general of the Centrists of Orense; Pablo Gonzalez Marinas, second vice chairman, Galician member of parliament and member of the Independent Galician Party, and Jose Rodriguez Pena, secretary general, who until now served as secretary general of the defunct Galicianist Party.

Ubiquitous Presence of Suarez

The officials who will be in charge of the various secretariats will be appointed from among the remaining 21 members of the executive committee. Also elected were 40 members of the political board, which will be filled out with another 60 members elected by the various local, district and provincial assemblies. Both elections, in which 15 members of the convention voted, were conducted by a show of hands.

Adolfo Suarez was everywhere at the convention. Over the weekend he met in Pontevedra with members of the Social Democratic Center Party, a fact which gave rise to a certain measure of suspicion. In this regard, Jose Rodriguez Pena, new secretary general of the Galician Coalition, said that it was curious that Adolfo Suarez goes to Galicia whenever there is some event connected with some Center option that differs from his own. For his part, Miguel Roca said that the political principles of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] differ but slightly from those of the Reformist Party, but that, whereas Suarez's strategy was planned for the long term, his had as its objective winning the general elections in 1986, beginning with the periphery and converging toward the center.

8089

CSO: 3548/264

BRIEFS

NEW AIR FORCE FIRING RANGE--The Air Force will hold a joint unit air firing camp in Oulunsalo from 28 May to 20 June. The Lapland Division will be responsible for the arrangements, and leader of the camp will be Colonel Vaino Rajamaki, unit commander. The air targets, pulled by a Learjet, will be shot at in an area over the sea between Kokkola and Oulu at a height of over 1,000 meters. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 24 May 84 p 21] 9611

NEW NAVY COMMUNICATIONS SHIP--The Navy accepted a new communications ship at the beginning of the week from the Uusikaupunki shipyard; it was christened with the name Kultaranta [Gold Coast] VII. The ship is a modification of the shipyard's Maxi Pilot type, which the state has previously acquired for the Customs and Maritime organizations and for the defense forces. During the summer months Kultaranta VII will be reserved for President Mauno Koivisto, and thus it will replace the Kultaranta V, which will be retired as too old. At other times the Navy will use the ship for various rescue services and for transporting the highest defense officers and official Navy guests. The ship has many kinds of resuscitation and medical equipment in order to transport sick people. The length of the reinforced-plastic Kultaranta VII is 12.5 meters, width 4 meters, draft 1.4 meters and displacement 15 tons. The main engines are two 260-kW diesels, which give the ship a speed of about 25 knots. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 17 May 84 p 8] 9611

CSO: 3617/169

MAINTENANCE OF CARRIER 'FOCH,' NEW SATELLITE SYSTEM

Paris COLS BLEUS in French 7 Apr 84 pp 4-5

[Article by Rene Guillemin]

[Text] In Toulon, the DTCN [Technical Directorate for Naval Construction] of the DGA [General Armament Delegation] invited about 40 reporters and press attaches to an information visit at the local DCAN [Directorate of Naval Construction and Armament]. This visit was designed to show the efforts made by the DCAN services in Toulon to support the naval air forces deployed off the Lebanese coast. The DCAN also gave presentations on the maintenance of the "Foch," the installation of a satellite communications system (SYRACUSE), and the facilities for nuclear attack submarines of the "Rubis" class. IGA [Armament Engineer] Minvielle, director of the local DCAN, reported on the role of the DCAN which devotes a major part of its work to studies on behalf of the DGA and the French Navy, and handles fleet maintenance and modernization as well as the major overhaul of Naval Aviation aircraft. This role is very important. Fleet maintenance and modernization costs for 1983 were about 1.1 billion francs for Toulon (700 million francs for added value, 100 million for subcontracted work, and 300 million for materials).

The DCAN has nearly 9,000 engineers, technicians, and workers. The Ships Division, which handles industrial and technical maintenance of the fleet, by itself has 3,000 employees, and subcontracts to about 500 people. Under the command of ICA [Chief Armament Engineer] Cavailles, in 1983 this division's workload increased by 200,000 manhours in response to the events in Lebanon. One of its most spectacular operations was the reconditioning of the "Clemenceau" aircraft carrier which had spent over 100 days in the eastern Mediterranean without a break. The Toulon DCAN had 2 weeks to perform the work required by the ship; it was then able to resume its essential mission as scheduled.

VAE [expansion unknown] Gagliardi, maritime prefect of the Third Region, and commander in chief for the Mediterranean, speaking "as a client," spoke of his confidence and praised the DCAN. "They have done a good job," he said, pointing to the ties of friendship uniting the Navy and the DCAN.

Careening of the "Foch"

At present, the DCAN's major project is the "Foch" aircraft carrier. It is now undergoing a 5-month IPER [Periodic Unavailability for Maintenance and Repair], to end in April. This operation (which used to be called a major careening) is being directed by IPA [Principal Armament Engineer] Changeur.

Work of this magnitude requires painstaking preparations. From May to September 1983, the DCAN made a financial evaluation of what was needed. The envelope allocated enabled them to plan for 550,000 hours of labor. They had to assemble or order the materials and the parts needed, negotiate contracts to be awarded for subcontracted work, and plan the work: docking, dockside tests, "point fixe," [meaning unknown], etc. The order for the "Foch" job (called an IPER technical contract) included 4,200 articles broken down into 20,000 elementary jobs: the contract was 600 pages long!

Ninety percent of the work was devoted to maintenance of the aviation facilities: catapults, deck landing brakes. We were able to see the remounting of the pit of the forward catapult. When the "Foch" resumes its tests after maintenance, it will launch about 100 models of a mass equivalent to the mass of the aircraft used on board. Complete maintenance of the catapults is essential after 4,500 planes are launched. An average of 450 DCAN personnel worked on the "Foch" IPER--with a peak of close to 600. The commander of the carrier, CV [Captain] Turcat, spoke of the contribution made by the crew to this work: 200,000 manhours in addition to the 550,000 hours spent by the DCAN.

The SYRACUSE System

Following the "Colbert," the "Foch" was outfitted with the SYRACUSE system [Satellite Radio Communication System]. Two small radomes, one on the port and the other on the starboard side, installed on the highest superstructures of the ship, will house two antennas. Their placement required the design and development of a special platform. An additional load of 15 tons has been placed 30 meters above the sea.

To put in place the electronic systems required for SYRACUSE, they had to transform the areas used, and plan for the installation of electrical cables, of cooling water ducts, and of ventilation ducts.

This SYRACUSE modernization for the carrier required:

- a. 25,000 hours of work, 3,000 hours of which were spent on the preparation of studies;
- b. 106 plans prepared or modified;
- c. 12 areas modified;
- d. 3,000 meters of cables; and
- e. 1,600 connection points.

The Submarine Job

The assignment of nuclear attack submarines to Toulon led the DCAN to set up specific industrial facilities and to train personnel in high-tech fields, such as nuclear propulsion. A presentation on a new specialized area, the Submarine Production Unit, was given by ICA Le Tallec and IPA Guegan.

A principal mobile intervention workshop was built in order to work on the nuclear boiler compartment of the submarines. This is actually a large diving chamber that moves above the maintenance basins and is outfitted with large-capacity handling equipment.

A nuclear workshop is designed for the inspection and repair of equipment in nuclear boilers, and for the storage and packaging of nuclear wastes. The nuclear fuel is stored in an underwater container.

The submarine area is in the Missiessy zone: it has three basins and a maintenance dock. In one of the basins we saw two conventional submarines of the "Daphne" class and in another, the "Rubis" nuclear attack submarine. The "Rubis" will soon be joined in Toulon by the SNA [Nuclear Attack Submarine] "Saphir." These facilities are designed to handle five SNA.

The specialized personnel were trained during practical training courses on reactors in Cadarache, at the DCAN in Brest during careening of the SNLE [Nuclear Missile-Launching Submarines] and in Cherbourg, where the SNA are built. Already preparations for the first "Rubis" IPER have begun.

Logistic Support

A presentation on logistic support for the fleet was given by ICA Betbeder and IPA Donzel. This occupies an important place in the DCAN's activities.

The stock of 450,000 spare parts can handle massive demands. A highly automated procedure has been designed to handle orders, removal from storage, "home delivery," and part reorders. There are 450,000 "part removals" a year, or 1,800 a day. For urgent requirements, the Toulon DCAN serves as a refitting port (for the Mediterranean, including Lebanon, the Indian Ocean, Djibouti, Papeete, Fort-de-France, and Noumea).

When the operational capability of a ship is endangered, an emergency procedure is used. The parts warehouse is open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Air shipment (via either military or civilian aircraft) is immediate. Ten items a day are handled by this procedure, which is reserved for exceptionally urgent cases. The DCAN knows the importance of sales of military hardware to foreign navies. A special logistic support office handles this after-sale service.

Finally, the Toulon DCAN is also responsible for two national logistic support missions:

- a. Allocation of materiel to ships;
- b. Centralized management of replacement supplies.

The Toulon DCAN is an immense industrial facility which can not be covered entirely in just a few hours. The visitors there on 7 March did learn a great deal, though, about the essential role the DCAN plays in keeping the fleet in good condition.

7679

CSO: 3519/347

HOEKZEMA ON PERSONNEL POLICY, LENGTH OF SERVICE

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS WEEKBLAD in Dutch 12 May 84 Supplement pp 1, 3

[Interview with Defense State Secretary W. K. Hoekzema by Charles Sanders and Piet de Wit: "Variable Military Service and More Women"; date and place of interview not given; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] A longer term of service for military people with a technically advanced position, a somewhat shorter one for the common soldier on guard duty or in the kitchen. Next to that, the policy with regard to the integration of women in the armed forces is being investigated and possibly adjusted. Spectacular changes, or is it fumbling in the margins?

There are changes in the offing in the personnel policy of the armed forces. The biggest employer of the country (all in all, 130,500 people work at defense) wants to achieve better productivity, exactly by a longer term of service. For the most technical positions within the defense machinery, that is. The nontechnicians among the conscripts, on the contrary, may in some cases leave the barracks earlier than after the 14 months which at present still apply. Variable military service is to prevent that technically highly qualified positions would be no longer achievable for conscripts.

Longer military service, what is concerned is an extension of 2 to 4 months, is often a bitter necessity because of the ever more advanced materials. For instance, it recently appeared that part of the new, computer-equipped tanks of the land forces were not operational because of, among other things, lack of well-trained personnel. The Steering Group Adjustment Terms of Service, installed in 1983, is to report still in this year about the possibilities to adjust the present terms of service.

Next to this problem, there is also still the issue of the integration of women in the armed forces. In that context, the Social Council for the Armed Forces, of which, among others, representatives of the labor movement and the Women's Council are members, at the end of last month made the recommendation to make all the positions in the armed forces open to women, both in principle and in practice. The Council made this recommendation at the request of the defense state secretary for personnel policy, Dr W. K. Hoekzema. "I am here at a

company which has very quickly started with the integration of women. It is of the utmost importance to indicate what the possibilities are and also the impossibilities for emancipation of those women in the armed forces." The perhaps least well-known state secretary of this cabinet on the personnel changes which are at hand at his ministry:

Regular Army

[Question] A system of variable military service is really a very old idea. What was the immediate cause for you to take this plan out of the closet again and to install, in September of 1983, a Steering Group Adjustment Terms of Service?

[Answer] I was stimulated by the tank report to tackle this issue. It was noted that the personnel of Leopard I and II tanks were not quite familiar with the advanced technologies, which we are gradually getting to deal with in this company. The first thought at that time was to henceforth have those positions, this concerned commanders and gunners, filled by professionals. I then said that this need not immediately be the conclusion. After all, if you extend that to its extremes, that in the course of time means a regular army, and I do not think that is a good thing. I believe in keeping the present cadre-militia army. For that, you will in some cases have to extend the terms of service in order to be able to give people a decent training. The band width needs to be somewhat enlarged.

[Question] Let us go back to that tank report for a minute. Did that not particularly concern a shortage of spare parts?

[Answer] Yes, that as well. But as state secretary for personnel, I extracted the relationship between advanced technology and quality of the people from it. And if one wants to maintain the present cadre-militia character of the armed forces, then one will have to face up to the term of compulsory service. I said in the same breath at that time that next to extensions for certain functions, abbreviation of terms of service should also be possible. There are of course also functions within the armed forces which can be fulfilled in a shorter time.

[Question] Let us just say, unschooled labor?

[Answer] Yes, for which a certain proficiency is needed at most. I am thinking, for example, of guard units.

[Question] You say you prefer a cadre-militia army over a regular army. Why?

[Answer] I think it is of utmost importance that there remains a clear relationship between the armed forces, as machinery, and society. When conscripts from that society are being brought into it six times a year, you preserve a concrete, almost physical interrelationship between the armed forces and society.

[Question] A regular army will become too secluded a unit?

[Answer] The chance is present then, anyway. I do not think it would happen within the Dutch relationships, where there are of course very clear democratic traditions, but the relationship with society is just much less manifest in a regular army.

[Question] Is the reason for maintaining the present cadre-militia army not just the cost?

[Answer] That is a second argument. We can not maintain a regular army with the present budget. That would become a very expensive situation.

[Question] Is it possible to indicate how many positions are actually concerned? How many conscripts are presently going to serve longer, or shorter, respectively?

[Answer] The way things are looking now, in both cases it will concern between 5 and 10 percent of the conscripts.

[Question] In the land forces, 40,800 conscripts are being scheduled for this year. Of these people, between 2,000 and 4,000 would therefore get a longer term of service, or a shorter one, respectively, than the present 14 months?

[Answer] That is correct. But it is still only a tentative indication. The final report is to be ready this year.

Mini-KVV [Short Term Volunteer] Man

[Question] The present situation, briefly: you now have the normal conscript who serves for 14 months, the conscripted officer and noncommissioned officer who serve for 16 months in the land forces, and for 17 months in the navy and the air force. And next to that, there are the KVV people, who stay for up to 6 years at the most.

[Answer] That is right. Now, I do not exclude the possibility that we presently will also be coming to mini-KVV people, because the present KVV period of 4 to 6 years is rather long. In that respect, I am thinking of contracts of 2 to 3 years. Next to that, there also could possibly come the figure in between the conscript and the mini-KVV man. Someone who after his term of service still reenlists. Somewhat like those, who continue to serve voluntarily.

[Question] Let us go back for a minute to that 5 to 10 percent of the conscripts, who will go and serve a little longer or shorter. How many months should we think of, then?

[Answer] For the vast majority, an extension of 2 months will be sufficient in order not to be pressed for time as far as training goes. It may be, that for a number of exceptional cases, the extension of the terms of service will be 4 months. When serving shorter, 2 months will indeed be the extreme; 12 months

is the limit. There should also grow something of a relationship of trust between conscripts and professional people.

[Question] Now, the Steering Group has been instructed to conduct an investigation on the basis of cost neutrality. Is the fact that you are so concerned about the fate of the conscripts not just primarily inspired by a money issue?

[Answer] No, not only by that. It is also a political approach: if you demand more from people, that need not signify that consequently those should be professional people. For ultimately that means a regular army.

[Question] But it only concerns 5 to 10 percent of all the conscripts!

[Answer] That is the situation that has resulted at this moment.

[Question] How do you intend to reward that good fellow who is going to serve longer and who therefore gives more of his knowledge and expertise to the nation?

[Answer] The idea is, that one should make a direct link between the remuneration and the period for which someone serves; thus for longer serving people a higher remuneration than for shorter serving people.

[Question] Can that be reconciled with that cost neutrality?

[Answer] Probably so. That does not mean that everything extra given to those who serve longer has to be taken away from those who serve a shorter term. The operating costs of military people decrease to the extent they serve longer. Moreover, this way, there are also less KVV people needed.

[Question] The total cost of a conscripted soldier in the land forces amounts to 22,734 guilders a year, that of a soldier on a KVV or professional basis to 35,227 guilders. Now, if this goes well, you will of course presently say: Hey, this is nice, I see a way to make money. I will discontinue that whole KVV system?

[Answer] I do not think that is possible. We can not do without that bit of flexibility of KVV people. Look, if you take on a professional military man, you are stuck with him until he is 55. Moreover, you are stuck with his retirement possibilities. If we had only professional officers, we would, just to give an example, get an enormous shortage of young lieutenants. And that is what those KVV people are for, then.

Unthinkable

[Question] In the navy, there are 1,400 conscripts and in the air force, 3,570. Will there be people there as well, who must or may stay longer?

[Answer] Although I made no exceptions for any branch of the armed forces, you should not lump that all together. The personnel system is very different

there. In practice, it will predominately play a role in the land forces. In the first place, because half of these consist of conscripts, and in the second place, because the land forces in time of war are a typical mobilization army. But of course it is also being looked into which possibilities there are in the navy and in the air force.

[Question] The army is one of those institutions which has gone for heavy technologization. It gradually seems to become one big electronic playground. What does this mean in the long run? We are now talking about 5 to 10 percent of the conscripts, who already have to serve longer in order to master the technical skills. Do you think that percentage is going to increase?

[Answer] I do not think so. You should then make that link to society again. We will presently get young people in who are more familiar with electronic machinery, who have feeling for that. They learn that in school as well, just look at all those minicomputers. Moreover, the goal is also to make more consumer-friendly machinery. Just look at the difference between the third-generation computers and now the minicomputers. I think that we have to be very sober, and really will keep it at around 10 percent.

[Question] Interest groups of conscripts, such as the AVNM [General Association of The Dutch Military Personnel] and the VVDM [Association of Conscripted Military] are afraid for the creation of "elite conscripts," because only people with better educations will be selected for those extended positions. Rightly so?

[Answer] No, that is nonsense. There are now certain requirements as to prior training, and those really will not get any heavier. At this moment, we demand for Leopard II personnel an LTS [Lower Vocational School] diploma. It is really not so, that the "bright boys" get the nice jobs. An operational commander rather have a less well-educated guy who knows the ropes than a guy with a good education and with two left hands.

[Question] Suppose that presently you will get too few volunteers for those extended positions. Are you then going to force people or will there remain freedom of choice?

[Answer] I think that willingness to serve somewhat longer is amply present. It is now also the case that we have no problem whatsoever to get volunteers for positions as noncommissioned officers. It should be possible to devise a mechanism in which you can very reasonably ask of someone to serve for 2 more months.

[Question] Lately there is much being made of women in the army. What do you intend to do in the coming years with the ladies in the armed forces?

[Answer] At the end of April, I received the report of the Social Council for the Armed Forces. I can not definitely say yet that I will draw this or that conclusion from that. First, I want to await the evaluations from the branches of the armed forces about the integration as it has progressed so far. On the basis of that I then want to develop a policy in which we indicate what the

possibilities are for women in the armed forces, and what the potential impossibilities are. Especially, because at the time of the signing of the Treaty of New York, we did not make any exceptions, like many other countries did, relating to the battle functions for women, for instance, it will have to be clearly indicated what Defense understands by integration. Then everybody will know where he and she stands.

[Question] Yes, that is all very nice, but do you yourself think it so very necessary that women will come into the armed forces?

[Answer] In our defense note, we say that we aim at socialization of the armed forces, and that we think, moreover, that those armed forces are an essential part of our society. Of course we then can not say that, when the idea of emancipation within that same society is concerned, we completely exclude the armed forces. To me, it is a given fact that an emancipation movement has been going on for years already. Women do not only function in all kinds of positions, but are accepted in them, as well.

As mayor of Coevorden, I had the experience of getting the first female police sergeant, and that was not a problem at all. Not the patrols at night, together with male colleagues, either. In various police departments, it can be seen that that integration is becoming more and more of a success. Even in the Mobile Units [riot police], women are being employed. Those are all clear signals.

[Question] It is not a fashionable phenomenon?

[Answer] No, I see it as a continuing development. A clear, structural social change. We, as defense, are concerned with that, as well. It is just that in our policy we will have to aim ourselves according to the evaluation reports from the three branches of the armed forces, and also to the report of the Social Council. Because we here do have a specific task, which possibly imposes limits to that integration. Our company has as its task to prevent war and to try, if it can not be done in any other way and the terrible moment is there, to achieve a stable situation again with the use of violence. And you will have to take that into account when addressing the question whether you will have to go and really use women for all positions. In that respect, not only purely physical strength plays a role, but also the position of women in society, such as we see it at this moment. One still takes certain traditional roles for granted. There should be a mutual process of acceptance.

Experience

[Question] You are speaking of the experience so far with women in the armed forces. That is hardly present, though; it is a man's business, after all, isn't it?

[Answer] We of course do have the experience of women, who have been integrated into the company, so to speak, from the Milva, the Luva and the Marva [Women's divisions of army, air force and navy]. Next to that, women are being trained at the moment at the KMA [Royal Military Academy], the KIM [Royal

Institute for the Navy] and the KMS [Royal Military School], and they are holding positions in the First Army Corps in Germany. I also attach very much value to the project with women on board the navy provisioning vessel "Zuiderkruis." People have been able to gather experience for 3 years now in that situation, which was and is being monitored. Those experiences are very important for the ultimate practical realization.

[Question] You are formulating all this very carefully. Are you keeping the possibility in mind that everything is not going to run so smoothly?

[Answer] I do have to do so, yes. At this moment, I do not yet have all the information available to get to a formulation of policy. The report of the Social Council is only one of the elements on which the integration policy is going to be based. I am now, however, going to try and come with a policy note as soon as possible.

[Question] It is often being said that, if we want to achieve complete integration of women in the armed forces, there should also come a conscription for girls. Do you start to smile now, or do you see something good in that?

[Answer] We definitely have no need for that. We do not think that way in the cabinet, and moreover, we would get a tremendous surplus of potential conscripts. That would only increase the problem of the unequal treatment of conscripts.

[Question] The women's movement does not talk about it, either, strangely enough. From the point of view of emancipation conscription of course should be a first "must."

[Answer] I think that they assume that if you want to achieve something, that should happen on a voluntary basis. Perhaps the women would see themselves again being put in a position of coercion in the case of conscription for girls.

12568

CSO: 3614/89

DEFENSE OFFICIALS, GENERALS PRAISE WOMEN'S ROLE IN FORCES

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 17 May 84 p 3

[Article by Hilde Saltz: "Raves Not Only From the Generals: Women in Norway's Army Are Already a Fact of Life"]

[Text] Oslo. Even high ranking functionaries in the Norwegian Ministry of Defense in Oslo reply with raves when the subject of women soldiers comes up: "They have contributed to a substantial increase in the level of performance during training, and this is true not only at the military academies." They also praise the fact that the male soldiers are spurred on to achieve a higher level of discipline by the ambition of the female personnel. As proof, statistics are presented which show that Norway's female soldiers even in active training can keep up with the males.

Major General Magne Sorensen, Inspector General of the Air Force of this Scandinavian country, points out the growing numbers of women applying for a life in the military and notes with pride their performance.

As of January 1977, it is possible for Norwegian women to volunteer for military service. They receive the same training as their male counterparts and even live in the same compounds. In the Oslo Ministry of Defense this is mentioned as if it were the most natural thing in the world. Female soldiers also participate in weapons exercises as a part of basic defense training. However, they are excluded from combat units of the infantry, artillery and cavalry, as well as from service on ships defending the coast in time of war.

A resolution was adopted in the Storting, the Norwegian parliament, to permit female soldiers to be in army brigades and regimental combat teams. Administrative positions in the Nike air defense missile units of the air force are also open to Norwegian women.

In addition, a high percentage of women are employed with the various headquarters, units and other military groups as civilian personnel. They also have the opportunity to join the mobilization groups which have military status, and when they do they receive uniforms and participate in regularly scheduled exercises.

A large number of female soldiers are also found in the reserves where they participate in regular training which can last for up to six months. The standard period of basic training for men as well as women is 12 months; 15 months in the navy and air force.

The four million Norwegians spell defense with a capital "D". This way of thinking is promoted at the military headquarters in Oslo. In 1983, the defense budget was three percent of the gross national product or 8.9 percent of the total national budget. Nearly 13 million kroner are provided in the budget for this year. For the 1984 to 1988 planning period, the government urged a real increase of three percent in order to ensure the defense of this 1752 km long but sparsely populated country (13 persons per square km). This also includes a so-called "total defense concept" which encompasses army, air force, navy and local units.

In peace time Norway has a standing army of about 50,000 troops, most of which are stationed in the less populated north for strategic and functional reasons. In order to compensate for this arrangement, say Norwegian defense experts, most of the exercises are held in the south.

The local units naturally represent an important element and are seen as the "backbone" of the mobilization effort. The units are located in the vicinity of the soldiers' hometowns and are responsible for protecting these areas and defending them if necessary. According to reports from army circles the average age of these soldiers is 32 years. They keep their equipment in their homes.

In view of the approximately 150,000 islands and the numerous fjords along the Norwegian coast, the navy and air force also assume primary importance. Complaints about equipment are becoming louder. "We have a huge deficit in terms of air defense weapons," is one example. General Sven Hauge points a finger at the economic situation when he warns that due to a lack of money Norway is more and more dependent in crisis situations on the assistance of its allies in NATO, which it has been a member of since 1949. He explains that 70 percent of the funds which have been made available for the purchase of materiel for the next five years have already been allocated: The newly acquired F-16 fighters will not be completely paid for until 1987.

Added to that are the costs incurred during peace time, such as those for monitoring the country's national waters and air space, and for storage of materiel in case of war. Constantly increasing equipment costs are thus becoming more and more critical. The medical services, too, require large amounts of money. General Hauge recalled the combined exercises of all three branches of the service in Norway in the fall of 1983 in which medical supply troops were strongly represented. The quality level was good and the personnel were enthusiastic. Nevertheless it is necessary, he said, to modernize equipment in this sector as well. In some areas a satisfactory level has already been achieved; it is expected that the first large field hospital will be finished this year and new equipment for mass transport has also been ordered.

The praise with which the generals greeted the enthusiasm of those engaged in the medical sector was also directed in no small measure to the women. The

contingent of female personnel which can be called upon in the case of mobilization and which participates in regular exercises of a military and medical nature in peace time includes a large number of highly qualified, trained nurses.

Following their basic military training, these nurses, along with female doctors, psychologists and chemists are part of the reserves and have the same career opportunities and chance for promotion as their male colleagues in military service.

Anneliese is also in the military. She talks with pride about the "new perspective" which the Norwegian military has given women by opening up to them careers in the army. She herself wanted to do something unconventional and in doing so she has had only pleasant surprises. Although she admits that at first her male colleagues looked at her with suspicion, she has never experienced anything like discrimination.

Harassment during training never occurred. "We were all much too busy," said the pert young woman in her mid-twenties. "We do our job and give our all to do it well." She could of course understand that the military is not for everyone. One needed a certain degree toughness and--this came somewhat hesitantly--an ability to overcome ones own inhibitions. And after all, she said, the Norwegian decision to allow women volunteers a career in the defense of their country was nothing unique. She pointed out not only the U.S. and Israel, but also gave Denmark, The Netherlands and Greece as examples. Without appearing aggressively emancipated, she said in conclusion that one could not in good conscience demand equal rights for men and women and at the same time try to avoid so-called unpleasant duties. "Norway's women as well as her men should share in her defense," she said with confidence.

12552

CSO: 3620/318

COMMENT ON MAJOR GOVERNMENT-MILITARY POLICY RIFTS

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 20 May 84 p 10

[Article by JASA: "Noteworthy Differences Between the Military High Command and Socialist Policy"]

[Excerpts] The statements made by the chief of the Defense General Staff, Admiral Liberal and by Rear Admiral Salgado in the REVISTA GENERAL DE LA MARINA [General Navy Review] reveal very noteworthy and even drastic differences of opinion between the military high command and socialist government policy. Taken together, I feel they constitute open censure, with an item by item, detailed list, of the Gonzalez cabinet's policies on at least these points: the NATO referendum, policy towards the USSR, the morale of the armed forces, a commitment to the defense of the West, military rearmament, conscientious objection, "pacifism," and "ecologism."

Salgado, in the above-mentioned articles, rejects the announcement of a referendum on NATO: "It would not be prudent to leave it to the sole influence of a few speeches." Admiral Liberal begins by spotlighting something the socialist government wants to play down: the heightening of East-West tension. He denounced "neutralism" as the first step towards vulnerability, warned against the risks of weakening the capability to resist, pointed out that "pacifism" seeks to unilaterally diminish Western power, criticized the "apparently sincere" campaigns against toys that imitate weapons along with drug permissiveness and opposition to maneuvers and firing ranges, and emphasized that the USSR exalts its own armed forces without the slightest hesitation.

A few days after the House of Deputies approved the principle of conscientious objection, Admiral Liberal said, "In the Eastern Bloc countries conscientious objection is not permitted, and military service is longer and much harder than in the West." The chief of the General Staff of Defense stated that "manipulated ecologism" is one of the means used to diminish Western industrial capability and he defended nuclear power plants as the "only available source of energy that is efficient over the long term." The admiral mentioned the weaknesses of the system of rule by law and defended Western bellicosity toward the USSR while analyzing the weak points of the alliance. "The Soviet threat is as strong as ever," he said. He added, "The stronger we are in the military, economic, political, and moral areas,

and the more impenetrable we are against the clever erosive techniques aimed at our multiple divisions, the more resistant we shall be."

This sweeping response to so many aspects of socialist policy was promptly answered by the minister of defense, who stated that, "No Spanish military officer on active duty should pronounce on the referendum." The minister did not choose to refer to the statements made by the chief of the General Staff, but it is obvious that there are two radically opposed concepts:

These contradictions come to light at a time when Prime Minister Gonzalez, with international tensions rising, is taking refuge in more ambiguities and delays in regard to the Spanish position, while so-called "pacifists," supported by socialist and communist sectors, plan to boycott the military parade at Valladolid with a show of aggressiveness towards the armed forces that is unprecedented. The government has remained silent while military disquiet increases as a result of the growing repudiation of the army.

9015

CSO: 3548/260

OVERVIEW OF BAZAN FINANCES, CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY

Madrid YA in Spanish 5 Jun 84 p 22

[Text] The Bazan National Military Construction Enterprise was the third INI [National Institute of Industry] firm in terms of export volume, with total exports last year valued at 39.598 billion pesetas. Bazan is now Spain's seventh-ranked exporting firm, while last year it was ranked as number 15. This improvement is due largely to its penetration in new markets, from which Spain had been absent until now, particularly in the naval ship sector. Its principal clients are some of the Latin American and African countries. Bazan has sold the following items to these countries: four coastal patrol vessels of the "Halcon" class to the Argentine Navy; four of the same class to Mexico; a corvette of the "Descubierta" class to the Moroccan Navy; and three "Pirana" patrol vessels to the Peoples Republic of the Congo.

Good Portfolio of Orders

At its El Ferrol plant, Bazan is now building three frigates of the FFG type for the Spanish Navy, which, along with the aircraft carrier "Principe de Asturias," will form the Spanish Navy's future combat group. Deliveries of these frigates will be made during the course of 1986 and 1987. At its Cartagena plant, Bazan is working on the construction of the "Mistral" and "Tramontana" submarines, which will be completed at the end of this year and early in 1985. Work is already in progress on the modernization of the "Delfin" submarine, and the completion of the work on the "Abukir" corvette, to be delivered to Egypt at the end of July and early August.

Intense Sales Promotion Campaign

At its San Fernando plant in Cadiz, Bazan is building a line freighter and two patrol vessels for an African country, in

addition to six tugboats for Saudi Arabia, whose final delivery is scheduled for October 1985. Bazan is conducting a large-scale sales promotion campaign in foreign markets, primarily in Africa, the Middle East, and in Latin America. In the area of naval research, the company is well along in its research project for the "Catamaran" patrol craft. This project is under Bazan's technical direction, and it is estimated that it will be completed in the next 3 months, according to a report by the specialized defense journal, BIRD.

This prototype, financed in equal shares by the CAICIT [Scientific Research Advisory Commission of the Ministry of Education] and by Bazan itself, will be used in future amphibian, patrol, and antisubmarine warfare missions.

In addition, Bazan will most likely take part in the development of the frigate designed for the years around 1995, intended for NATO members. The participation quota is now being considered by the ministry of defense.

7679

CSO: 3548/271

SERIES OF REPORTS ATTACKS MILITARY'S HANDLING OF SUB HUNTS

Lapses in Communications, Command

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 26 May 84 p 6

[Article by Sune Olofson]

[Text] The submarine hunt in Karlskrona was marked by big lapses in military leadership and communications functions. Tactics were poor and the analytical group was too weak. The defense staff is now undergoing a process of self-criticism and soul-searching.

Schuback issued directives. Jedeur-Palmgren was in charge of ships, helicopters, submarines and ocean-based troops. Forenius was in charge of mines, troops along the beaches, barricades and machine-guns.

"After so many submarine hunts we should have learned more about leadership and coordination," said Jean-Carlos Danckwardt, retired colonel and area commander during the U-137 incident.

Captain Frank Rosenius is OB [Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces] Lennart Ljung's right hand on submarine defense issues:

"The expectations created have been too high. Too many people think we can hunt submarines inside the archipelagos. We cannot and we are not going to be able to. We could not even block off the Karlskrona basin. We did it too poorly and too late."

Rear Admiral Christer Kierkegaard studied the events in Karlskrona at the request of OB and compiled a report that is very critical of some aspects:

"The intelligence center, which received reports and intelligence from the public and the sub hunters during the hunt was too weak and the analysis group could not keep up."

Command Functions During Karlskrona Sub Hunt
45 Days in February-March 1984

Commander of defense
area: Vice-Admiral
Bengt Schuback issued
directives and set
objectives.

Chief of the south
coast naval base:
Commander Lennart
Jedeur-Palmgren was
responsible for ves-
sels, helicopters, subs
and sea-based troops.



Tactical leaders.
One of them was Cap-
tain Emil Svensson.
Directed ocean units
and selected the type
of weapons used.

Intelligence center.
All reports and obser-
vations were received, --
studied and analyzed
here.

Chief of Blekinge
artillery defense:
Colonel Stefan
Furenius was re-
sponsible for
mines, machine-
guns, barriers and
troops along the
beaches. Contacts
with civil authori-
ties.



Barricade bat-
talion chiefs.
One of them was
Lieutenant Colonel
Roland Hultgren.
Directed land-based
troops and chose
the type of weapons
used.

The submarine hunt in Karlskrona was led locally by the future head of the navy, Vice-Admiral Bengt Schuback. The structure and work of the leadership group was characterized by gaps, in the present view of the defense staff. Several leaders made decisions simultaneously, the intelligence center was saturated too quickly and the analysis group could not keep up, tactical leaders and barricade battalion chiefs should have been the same unit. The defense staff is now going through a period of self-criticism and soul-searching.

Conditions Good

All Sweden's sub-hunting resources were in place. They included experienced sub hunters like Captain Emil Svensson. The geographical conditions for search and surveillance were good.

There was no war.

Swedish troops were never fired on or pinned down by artillery barrages.

But the operative leadership was built up in the same way as if there had been a full-scale war in the area.

Even so the armed forces did not succeed in forcing to the surface and identifying the intruders, despite the fact that subsequent investigations found at least ten certain indications that foreign underwater activity was really going on in the area.

"The reason for our poor showing was not just a shortage of resources," said Frank Rosenius who served as secretary in Christer Kierkegaard's investigation.

Three Chiefs

SVENSKA DAGBLADET has talked to a majority of the officers who were involved in one way or another in the Karlskrona hunt. Some talked quite openly and said that now is the time for critical scrutiny, some said, "I don't mind talking about it, but don't quote me," while others were even more cautious and referred to the defense staff information spokesmen.

Assessments of defense efforts given by the officers ranged from "fiasco" to "a few mistakes were probably made."

The submarine hunt was primarily led by three chiefs, the commander of the military area, Vice-Admiral Bengt Schuback, the chief of the south coast naval base, Commander Lennart Jedeur-Palmgren and the chief of Blekinge's coastal artillery defense, Colonel Stefan Furenius.

Schuback issued the directives, Jedeur-Palmgren was in charge of ships, helicopters, submarines and ocean-based troops and Furenius was in charge of mines, troops along the beaches, barriers and cannons.

Great Confusion

Next in line under Jedeur-Palmgren were tactical leaders, one of whom was Emil Svensson. Furenius gave orders to his barricade battalion chiefs.

"It is not good when several chiefs make decisions simultaneously," said Frank Rosenius. "At times there were four different opinions on the nature of a measure. At the very least tactical leaders and barricade battalion

chiefs should have been one function. The tactical leader should have been able to keep a finger on everything, which was not the case."

Instead there was confusion and with it ineptitude.

Apparently the confusion was so great at times that Kierkegaard's later investigation could not determine what happened and what did not with respect to times, places and types of action taken. "There were certain shortcomings in the ability to document our own activities," the report stated carefully.

Why were no changes made in the leadership during the hunt which lasted almost 50 days?

"The inertia of the system; it is hard to make changes in a firmly-rooted organization," said Frank Rosenius.

The analysis group was quickly saturated and kept busy by separate indications instead of making hypotheses, checking experiences and synthesizing them.

Film Forgotten

There were problems in cooperation and communication between seagoing and land-based units, reports were delayed and in situations where weapons should have been employed or tactics adapted, nothing happened.

Reconnaissance reports from our own submarines, for example, were never checked against available radar data and soldiers taking photographs forgot to put film in their cameras.

It took 2 days for the navy and the coastal artillery to lay mines and nets at the outlet from Karlskrona. There was no regulation of ship and leisure craft traffic until 10 days after that.

"These were halfhearted measures. It was possible for the intruders to go in and out in the shelter of other vessels during the initial period," said Frank Rosenius.

Indiscriminate Shooting

Jean-Carlos Danckwardt thinks it was wrong of officers to allow soldiers to shoot at everything and everybody.

"It was poor tactics to hunt foreign soldiers in the water. Instead we should have waited and allowed them to walk on shore and seized them then."

Rosenius agrees to some extent and says that "shots were fired somewhat indiscriminately."

On Sunday, 26 February, units were in contact with a foreign vessel for almost an hour.

Not a single shot was fired. It was not possible to coordinate and order the use of weapons, navy press spokesmen explained.

"That can only be something made up afterward," said Jean-Carlos Danckwardt. "Obviously it was possible. All the options and all the units were there and in position."

What would have happened if there had been a full-scale war in the area?

"The coordination and leadership problems would hardly have been handled any better. In wartime officers and commanders would also have much more to do and the situation would be much more urgent," said Frank Rosenius.

Better Submarine Defense

This is now a period of soul-searching for the defense staff, according to Frank Rosenius. He pointed out that sometimes lessons have to be learned after the fact.

"In the middle of the hunt it is hard to get an overall view of what is most appropriate; it is easy to make mistakes. Often one is not certain of the value of indications until an in-depth analysis has been made.

"There is genuine uncertainty within the defense organization about what we can and should do. Unfortunately we will probably have to live in the gray zone for a while longer until the new and improved resources have gone into operation," said Rosenius.

At this moment and throughout the summer submarine defenses are being improved substantially.

Admiral Leading Hunt Disagrees

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 27 May 84 p 7

[Article by Roger Magnegard]

"Not everything was perfect during the search in Karlskrona. But the mistakes made were not significant with regard to the outcome."

Vice-Admiral Bengt Schuback said this to SVENSKA DAGBLADET. He also said that he "learned something from the mistakes and reported this.

"There is a list of things that can be improved--the things that were done incorrectly do not have to be repeated."

But Schuback would not be more specific about which points were on the list. "If I did that the intruder could ponder over countermeasures."

In yesterday's issue of SVENSKA DAGBLADET, Captain Frank Rosenius criticized the "poor tactics" during the Karlskrona hunt and maintained that the "analysis group was too weak." Other officers also agreed with the criticism that has been directed primarily against the leaders of the hunt, although they did not wish their names to be used.

Mistakes Conceded

Bengt Schuback is military commander of the area and was thus the highest leader of the hunt. He gave subordinate officers directives and set objectives.

"The criticism comes from thinkers," he said. "Neither the defense staff nor OB Lennart Ljung has presented it officially."

But he did concede that "several mistakes" were made during the hunt.

"I will not comment on individual events. But we have learned something from what happened."

Soldiers

But according to Schuback there was a lot that "worked well" and some of the criticism had a "natural explanation.

"The draftees who took part on the patrol boats, for example, had just been called in. Therefore they did not do their work perfectly, nor could one expect them to.

"Soldiers are part of what the leadership has to work with. Therefore the leadership did not function perfectly either."

Schuback pointed out that if he were faced today with the same conditions that prevailed at the start of the Karlskrona hunt, he would act the same way.

"I would give the same officers orders to lead the search. I might adjust the responsibility somewhat and be more detailed in my directives."

Schuback said the reason why he never did this during February and March was that "we had no idea what was in store for us--with foreign soldiers jumping over the Swedish islands.

"We did not know then what we do today."

Kierkegaard's investigation charged that "there were some shortcomings in the ability to document our own activity." According to SVENSKA DAGBLADET's sources this was a sign of the confusion that prevailed in the leadership.

Action Most Important

"During a submarine hunt the important thing is not to write up what one is doing, the most important thing is to act. The historians have to come second and it is possible that some of the words get lost," Schuback said.

According to Frank Rosenius the analysis group was quickly saturated and busy with individual indications instead of making hypotheses, checking experiences and synthesizing them.

Pluses and Minuses

"That is his own opinion," Schuback stressed. "As a member of the analysis group he knows how they worked--but it is quite clear that we need computer assistance to sort out all the information we receive."

On 26 February units had contact with a foreign object for almost an hour. No weapons were used. "It was not possible to coordinate and order the use of weapons," navy spokesmen explained.

"This is something they made up afterward," it has now been charged.

"Wrong," said Schuback. "It was the submarine rescue ship 'Belos' that was in contact and it cannot guide helicopters. That is one of the lessons we learned during the hunt."

When Schuback adds up the positive elements that emerged during and after the hunt, he feels that the criticism in yesterday's SVENSKA DAGBLADET is not all that serious.

"I do not take it that hard. There are pluses and minuses in the military organization's structure and function and these can always be discussed."

GDR Disinformation Campaign Charged

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 28 May 34 p 8

[Article by Roger Magnegard]

[Text] Sweden is said to be building new minisubs for use in the fight against foreign attack divers. The subs would also keep an eye on submerged hydrophones and other underwater equipment.

This charge was made by the East German military magazine, MILITARTECHNIK, which also showed a detailed sketch of the minisub.


"This is disinformation," said defense information chief Hans Dahlberg.

"I have not read the article myself, but we have no plans for this kind of submarine."

"This is simply an attempt to shuffle the cards so that people won't know which countries have minisubs at their disposal."

The news item on the Swedish minisub was presented in a brief article along with other correct military news items. The Swedish submarine, called the CGS (Coast Guard Submersible) is described very precisely:

"The craft weighs 70 tons under water and 60 tons on the surface. The length is estimated at 17.5 meters, the width at 2.6 meters, the height at 5.15 meters and the draft at 2.3 meters."



This is MILITARTECHNIK's sketch of the Swedish Coast Guard Submersible minisub.

Key:

- | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Ultra shortwave antenna | 7. Accumulators |
| 2. Radar antenna | 8. Crew space |
| 3. Periscope | 9. Ballast tank |
| 4. Hydrophone equipment | 10. Electric motor |
| 5. TV camera | 11. Diesel generator |
| 6. Rudder | 12. Life preserver |

Cruising Speed

Under water the minisub has a maximum speed of 9 knots--on the surface the maximum speed is 8 knots. Cruising speed varies between 3 and 4 knots and then the cruising radius exceeds 50 nautical miles--which means that the accumulators are discharged 80 percent.

If the minisub proceeds at its highest speed the cruising radius is 27 nautical miles. In a surface position it has a maximum running time of 20 hours. The recommended diving depth is 100 meters, but it is possible to go down to 200 meters.

There is a six-man crew--captain, mate, two radio and radar operators, one lookout and one chief engineer.

Visual Reconnaissance

The minisubs are equipped with periscope, ultra shortwave radio, equipment for underwater communication, underwater camera, video tapeplayer, searchlight, gyro and magnetic compasses, log and depth measurement device. It is also built with special "windows" for visual reconnaissance.

Lies

"It is conceivable that the East Germans used a familiar model as the basis for the sketch," said Hans Dahlberg. "But where they got it I cannot say."

Dahlberg thinks the background for the article is an attempt to "pep up" the East German armed forces. Totally incorrect information has also appeared in other East German publications recently.

"A while back one could read that a group of draftees were hopelessly intoxicated when firing live ammunition from a cannon in Gotland--which was also a lie," said Dahlberg.

Minisub Building Denied

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 29 May 84 p 9

[Article by Roger Magnegard]

[Text] The minisub the East German periodical MILITARTECHNIK alleged the defense system is developing is Swedish. The design and sketch were made at Kockums Shipyard.

"We produced and presented the sketch back in 1980-81," said director Roger Spremont of Kockums Shipyard in Malmo. "But we never succeeded in selling any."

According to MILITARTECHNIK the minisubs are intended for use in fighting foreign attack divers. They are also intended to keep an eye on submerged hydrophones and other underwater equipment.

But the armed forces definitely denied ordering any minisubs: "They do not fit in with our defensive goals"--and Kockums revealed that they have not received any inquiries from the navy.

The reason for producing the sketch at all was the shipyard crisis.

"We were thinking of selling them to patrol organizations--concerns that deal with underwater security problems," Spremont said.

The submarines were specially designed so the crew could detect saboteurs beneath the surface, which is the reason for the windows and the search-light. Altogether six different variations were sketched. Some of them were even capable of ejecting their own divers at great depths.

"However the sketches are quite simple. We had no intention of proceeding with the project unless we found some purchasers."

Roger Spremont presented the minisubs in Goteborg the first time. This was before the Harsfjarden incident, in other words before the Swedish defense system clearly realized that foreign minisubs were operating in our waters.

From 16 to 24 March 1982 three of the sketches were displayed during a lecture in China.

"But the project never got any further than that. We have not bent a single sheet of steel to make a minisub," Spremont assured us.

If Kockums' minisub is built anyway, the purchaser can count on a price of around 1 million kronor per ton. That means the minisub referred to by MILITARTECHNIK would cost around 70 million kronor.

Navy Concentrating on Key Targets

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Jun 84 p 8

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] Submarine defense will be concentrated on certain militarily sensitive areas. That is the main content of the new directive for submarine defense that the government is preparing. A parliamentary group on the Riksdag Defense Committee will see the directive on Thursday.

This fall OB Lennart Ljung will explain how submarine defense should be organized with respect to assignments, organization and materiel, according to the directive.

A special sub force that will be ready in 1987 is being organized. The force includes helicopters, airplanes, magnetic coils and hydrophone equipment, among other things.

OB will then decide how quickly another sub-hunting force should be set up.

Priority

The directive further says that OB should describe the possibility of putting a priority on patrolling in certain areas.

The Swedish territorial water boundary is 12 nautical miles and in principle the entire coast should be patrolled. The main question for OB will be to clarify how areas of special military importance can be protected from submarine violations. The most important thing is to prevent foreign submarines from entering the Karlskrona area and approaching the Musko base.

The entire Swedish coastline is 280 miles long. In practice only the Baltic Sea is open. Foreign submarines do not have the right to pass freely through the Aland narrows into the Sea of Bothnia and the Bothnian Gulf.

It is an important patrol task for both Sweden and Finland to prevent illicit traffic in this area. This is a sensitive security policy issue.

The surveillance around the Market and Understen beacons is said to be effective. Finland has manufactured sonars for underwater listening that are very effective even in shallow water.

Dispute

Another question is how much money should be invested in the wartime organization and how much in the peacetime organization. Hunting submarines comes under incident preparedness in peacetime and among other things it is planned to build several coastal corvettes to patrol the ocean area. There is a military dispute as to whether coastal corvettes are a good investment. OB must take a stand on this question when he submits his so-called program plan for all the armed forces in the fall.

OB's proposals for organizing submarine hunts is supposed to be ready by fall. The government will then decide whether to appoint a new submarine commission. The government is waiting to appoint a submarine commission for two reasons. First the government wants to see if the submarine violations stop. If they do not the government wants to achieve as much parliamentary agreement as possible on how future submarine hunts should be organized. There are now divided opinions about this, especially within the military forces.

Palme Book on Sub Policies

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 8 Jun 84 p 8

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] Sweden should pursue its submarine policy along the two main lines drawn up in the spring of 1983. One line is to strengthen sub-hunting capacity, the other is to consistently demand respect for the territorial integrity of other countries in combination with sharp protests against encroachments.

Prime Minister Olof Palme wrote this in a lengthy foreword to a book entitled, "Sweden's Foreign Policy." The book is a compilation of Social Democratic foreign policy actions following the government shift on 8 October 1982. The book includes some of the speeches Olof Palme made after the change in government.

Palme says in the foreword that there is great agreement on Sweden's neutrality policy but this agreement has not led to a comfortable unifying concept. A foreign policy debate is very important.

Olof Palme refers to the debate on Swedish foreign policy that took place in 1959 and led to Tage Erlander putting out a book with the title, "Swedish Foreign Policy."

In 1959 there was an extensive discussion on the policy of neutrality with Jarl Hjalmarson, then leader of the Conservatives.

High Drama

In his book Palme says there was high drama in connection with the government shift on 8 October 1982. Currency was flowing out of the country and the submarine hunt was going full blast in Harsfjarden.

The day before the government changeover Olof Palme learned from OB that something important was going on in Harsfjarden. A defense net had been disturbed and a mine system touched off. The event was later characterized as the break-out of a foreign submarine leaving Harsfjarden.

Palme stressed that the line the government adopted on sub issues after the Submarine Commission presented its report in April 1983 will be pursued at all costs. We will bear in mind that everyone says they respect Swedish neutrality, Palme added.

Palme also said that in their government position the Social Democrats will work for a strict neutrality policy, a peace policy that creates trust, the promotion of a dialogue between rich and poor lands and the expression of our view on conflicts around the world.

There is a clear Swedish security policy interest in promoting detente and in working actively for arms reduction and measures that create confidence, wrote Palme, who then reviewed a number of actions the government had taken.

Nordic Zone

The superpower position in the Nordic region has changed as a result of the development of the base in Murmansk, NATO's stockpiling plans in Norway, the stationing of nuclear submarines in the Baltic Sea and increased intelligence activity by both military alliances in our area, he said.

The talks on a Nordic nuclear-free zone should be carried out on the basis of the long-established and self-evident respect for the right of each Nordic land to determine for itself which policy best serves its national interests. Formulating precise conditions and provisions for a Nordic zone at this time is not possible nor is it wise policy, in Palme's view.

He stated that the United Nations is Sweden's major forum for presenting its own peace initiatives and supporting those of others.

He then discussed various initiatives in the European area, among them the present security conference, the conflicts in the Middle East and Central America and the violations of human rights in Afghanistan, Poland and Turkey, emphasizing the specific point that it is important for Sweden to maintain the principles of international law.

Conservative Criticism

In conclusion, Olof Palme returned to Sweden's policy of neutrality. There is no doubt that there is strong support for this policy, but in some notable instances the Conservatives have placed party zeal ahead of national interests, he wrote.

Study: Soldiers Lacked Motivation

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Jun 84 p 7

[Article by Karin Nilsson]

[Text] Swedes are much too tolerant in a threatening situation. We take a lot before we decide to act and we have little feeling for defending our own territory.

Those are the views of Ben Shalit who works for the Behavioral Science Institute at FOA [Defense Research Institute]. Together with four colleagues he made a study of psychological preparedness during the latest submarine hunt in Karlskrona. He is project leader for an FOA project called "Performance in a Threatening Situation."

"The situation in Karlskrona offered an excellent opportunity to study reality. We have worked out a method to measure how individuals experience and act in a threatening situation.

"The part that concerns the civilian population's reactions has already been submitted to the county councils and the civil defense. The military part contains concrete proposals for changes and improvements in military training. The report has not yet been published.

"But the military authorities have read parts of the report and their reactions have been positive," said Ben Shalit.

He stressed that the report is not a criticism of the military but simply a factual description of the situation that prevailed in Karlskrona.

One of the things shown in the study is that people's concept of what happened is based only 5 percent on what the mass media reported.

"The most important information is the kind one gets on the spot. The local population almost totally ignored the mass media efforts," said Ben Shalit.

The report also shows that the authorities are wrong not to hand out information.

This creates great uncertainty and uneasiness among the general public.

"It is better for the authorities to say they don't know anything than to say nothing at all."

Tolerance

It was characteristic of the soldiers' behavior that they showed a much too high level of tolerance.

"Even when they had direct orders to shoot, they hesitated," said Ben Shalit. "That is excellent behavior in civilian life, but it is unacceptable in a conflict. They did not behave like soldiers."

The report also deals with examples of irrational behavior. One example is the identity checks that were introduced.

"This made the leadership feel that something was being done. But the checks did not have any objective purpose. The intention was obviously not to sort out foreigners, since a Swedish driver's license was enough to permit passage.

"Anyone at all can get hold of something like that."

This is a typical example of conflict behavior that creates a false sense of security. Formal regulations that serve no purpose reduce capacity and preparedness and in some circumstances can be actually dangerous.

The study also showed that both soldiers and officers were poorly informed and psychologically unmotivated.

"Psychological motivation is more important than the very best military equipment. It is meaningless to put money into expensive equipment for a defense force that does not act," Ben Shalit said.

"Psychological motivation cannot be raised on individual occasions. It must be the foundation of all military training.

"Group thinking must be introduced back in basic training. It is much easier to act aggressively in a group than as an individual. Any ice hockey trainer knows that."

But H. G. Wessberg, information secretary for the defense staff, was critical of the opinions presented.

"Ben Shalit seems to forget that we were not involved in a war in Karlskrona. There are clear rules as to when and how to fire shots in peacetime. Of course psychological motivation is important, but an overemotional involvement could have had very unpleasant consequences in Karlskrona."

The defense forces are already working with small units in many areas. And group solidarity proved to be very strong in Karlskrona.

"But of course it is possible to do even more to create solidarity and to heighten soldiers' feeling of being part of a group," said H. G. Wesslund. [as printed]

He could not say if the report would lead to some concrete changes in military training.

"First we must look at the entire report," he said.

6578

CSO: 3650/224

ARMED FORCES BRANCHES DISPUTE MISSILE PROCUREMENT PROGRAM

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 22 May 84 p 3

[Article by Erik Liden]

[Text] There is conflict on the future shaping of the defense forces even in an unchanged defense economy. When Commander-in-Chief Lennart Ljung meets today with his branch chiefs in military management, sensitive considerations on weapons systems will be discussed.

In the beginning of June the commander-in-chief must present his ideas for the future to the government, and right now it is already clear that the commander-in-chief did not earmark sufficient funds to guarantee the survival of the Swedish missile industry, which was a part of Defense Minister Anders Thunborg's directive.

When the commander-in-chief presents Perspective Plan, Phase A, which is the official name of the commander-in-chief's studies on general defense development up to the year 2005, he will also receive a directive to distribute the money so that missile production will be assured even with the present defense economy. The plan is an important basis for the 1987 defense decision.

The defense staff's studies of the future show, together with a missile analysis in the Defense Materiel Office, that in the future it will be hard to count on ship-mounted missiles. Therefore the acquisition of coastal corvettes must be discussed further.

A coastal missile battalion, which can be stationed several miles inland and shoot out over the ocean, will be three times less expensive per missile fired than the corresponding missile from ship to sea.

In the navy, this consideration has already led to conflicts between the fleet and the coast artillery. What is more, the coastal corvette is not as well-suited to chase submarines as earlier studies indicated.

Because of its size, the coastal corvette interferes with the thorough search system against submarines both in submarines and other vessels that take part in the search. In combat, they are also significantly more vulnerable than a

coastal missile battalion that can be hidden in the terrain and that is therefore difficult to differentiate from other army and coast artillery units.

Another question for the future that is to be decided is that of the role of the tank. Shall Sweden gamble on a new tank in the 1990's or increase mechanization in the other branches instead?

Studies show that indirect fire with modern target-seekers is cheaper than a new tank. Tank experts in the army claim this is wrong because it takes up to two minutes for a target-seeking shell to reach a tank after it has been discovered.

This means that the tank can maneuver out of the target-seeker's reach. About the same argument is put forth in favor of the arrow projectiles of the tanks over slow missiles such as TOW.

The commander-in-chief has chosen to account for what the money appropriated will accomplish. He has himself not made any special considerations except for providing, as many times before, that additional funds be earmarked if a weapons system becomes more expensive than anticipated. It is doubtful if the government will accept this in the present difficult economic situation.

The missile that is to be developed into a fixed coastal missile will probably be Saab's Sea Target Missile 15, which today is found on the old torpedo boats of the Spica class. The navy has already had to borrow 100 million kronar from the air force to pay for its final ship order.

Air Force

The air force is also to have a type of Missile 15 for the JAS interceptor. Further monies are also necessary to equip the coastal corvettes with the extra submarine-chasing equipment.

In the next phase of perspective planning, Phase B, the commander-in-chief will have the opportunity to make a detailed development of future war organization, and this will lead to difficult questions first of all in the navy, but also in the army. The large material question of the air force, the JAS interceptor, is settled.

The government was already expecting more clear-cut solutions from the commander-in-chief, since the studies clearly point toward possibilities of economy.

9124

CSO: 3650/214

SUBMARINE-HUNT FAILURES BLAMED FOR DROP IN DEFENSE WILL

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 23 May 84 p 5

[Article by Omar Magnergard]

[Text] The long and unsuccessful submarine-hunt in Karlskrona has contributed to a lessening of confidence in the ability of the Swedish defense forces to preserve the peace. The will to defend has also suffered.

This is the result of studies made by Sifo in March and April at the Preparedness Office for Psychological Defense.

"Nevertheless, I do not find the result alarming," Per-Axel Landahl of the Preparedness Office said. "Defense is supported by a stable part of the Swedish people."

Question: Suppose Sweden is attacked. Do you think we should offer armed resistance even if the outcome for us is uncertain?

In the fall of 1980 (after U 137), 80 percent answered yes. In May 1983 (after the report on Harsfjarden) 81 percent said yes. As late as last fall 81 percent said yes.

But now only 74 percent answer yes. And among women, only 66 percent believe in resistance.

"Information on security policy is generally bad," Landahl said. "The people still don't understand that an attacker can only devote a small part of his resources to Sweden."

Greater education and age lead to more confidence in defense. Particularly among men. The women have not become more negative on defense. On the other hand, they have become more uncertain.

Question: Do you believe that our defense forces increase our chances of keeping out of a possible war?

A year ago 60 percent of those asked thought so. And 53 percent last fall. Today the confidence has sunk to 41 percent. Only one woman in three believes

in the ability of the defense forces to preserve peace.

The perception of the strength of the defense forces has not changed in the meantime. Most people continue to believe that Sweden has "a satisfactory defense."

Sixty-six percent thought they received sufficient information on what happened in Karlskrona. Twenty-nine percent didn't think so.

A large majority of those questioned -- 86 percent -- says it has complete understanding for the limited flow of information that took place. Sixty-four percent say -- in spite of the failure -- they have great confidence in the defense effort to handle the submarine-hunt.

"A surprising declaration," Landahl thinks. At the same time it probably shows the confidence people in general have in the defense forces.

9124

CSO: 3650/214

MILITARY

SWEDEN

POLISH AIR FORCE PLANE INTRUDES INTO BALTIC AIRSPACE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 May 84 p 41

[Text] Nothing indicates that the Polish military aircraft that penetrated Swedish air space several times Monday had contact with a submarine. The Swedish Defense Department does not know what happened to the aircraft after the last repulse.

The aircraft that on Monday flew far into Swedish air space several times was of military register. It was of the type AM2-Colt. It is a one-engined propeller plane of which 500 have been produced since 1949. It is used for both civilian and military purposes and for training. The plane can be used, for example, for photographic search.

Two fighter aircraft from Kallinge repulsed the plane in the air over Blekinge in the outer archipelago. The last repulse was made at 1420 on Monday.

The aircraft gave no sign of being in trouble. Therefore the Defense Department does not think it likely that the aircraft was supposed to fly to Sweden.

"After the last repulse we don't know what happened to the Polish plane. Nothing speaks against its return to Poland," First Staff Editor Bertil Lagerwall of the defense staff said to TT.

9124

CSO: 3650/214

POLITICAL RHETORIC ESCALATES OVER UNEMPLOYMENT

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 3 Jun 84 pp 1,10

[Passages enclosed in slatli s printed in boldface]

[Text] Ankara (TERCUMAN) - The Chairman of Turk-Is disclosed his views to TERCUMAN on the subject of "unemployment" which is Turkey's biggest social problem and grows like an avalanche with every passing year, speaking for the government, the opposition and also the working segment of the population.

The Deputy head of the Motherland Party, Halil Sivgin, said the following with regard to the measures taken to eliminate unemployment:

/"As it is also stated in the government program, it is necessary to give special importance to increasing investments in order to eliminate unemployment which continues to be Turkey's chief problem. The problem of unemployment is the accumulated result of many years. For this reason it would not be realistic to say that it can be solved within a short period of time. It is only possible by implementing correct, stable and firm policies to prevent unemployment from rising and to decrease the unemployment which has gradually accumulated over the years. It would be a more realistic approach to view unemployment not only as the problem of governments but also as that of the state. Our government has made it its aim to solve unemployment both locally and for the whole of Turkey by encouraging investments in the East and the South East."/

Unbearable

The Secretary General of the HP [Populist Party] Ayding Gurkan disclosed his views on this subject on behalf of his party, in the following words:

/"In the 10 year period between 1968 to 1978 Turkey was able to develop at a rate of 6.5% annually. Whereas in the past 5 years this rate of increase has dropped to an average of 2.4%. For instance, the rate of increase for 1983 was 3.2%. And it will be about the same in 1984. For open and hidden unemployment to be totally eliminated in Turkey the rate of increase should be around 10%. With a rate of increase of about 8% it would only be possible to prevent open unemployment. While with a 6 to 7% rate of increase there would be some unemployment but that would remain within tolerable limits for the population. But if this rate of increase drops to 2.4%, as is the case for the period for which the Honorable Ozal carries the responsibility, then 300,000 people will remain unemployed each year and no population can stand this in the long run.

The Honorable Ozal is trying to make the population accept unemployment as some kind of fate. However, unemployment is not a fate, it is the product of clumsy and inept economic policies. The Ozalist obsolete concept of the economy, which does not correspond to Turkish realities, brought a Turkey which was developing at a rate of 6.6% during the 1st Plan period and at a rate of 7.1% during the period of the 2nd plan, down to the level of a Turkey which crawls at a rate of 2 to 3%. The first and second Plan periods are the most eloquent of replies to the sophistry (there is no alternative to unemployment).

If the 5th 5-Year Plan had had a chance to be implemented according to serious, social democratic principles it might have been possible to decrease the numbers of the hordes of unemployed in Turkey."/

What Did the ANAP [Motherland Party] Do?

The Secretary General of the Nationalist Democratic Party Ulku Soylemezoglu pointed out that the problem of unemployment was a problem that should be solved first and said the following:

/"In Turkey there is a big mass of unemployed people. Even if some of the statistics published here and there from time to time, which show the number of the unemployed to be 3.5 million, are viewed as exaggerated, it is a fact that in our country the mass of the unemployed is large enough to disturb the social structure.

There are 2 kinds of unemployed in Turkey. The first kind are the so called hidden unemployed who, although they appear to have an occupation, do not produce anything like, for instance the surplus labor force in agriculture. The other being the group which looks for work but does not find any openings. And those can be subdivided into 2 sections: those that were unable to obtain any employment so far and those who although they had a job before subsequently lost it. The most recent kind of unemployed called the industrial unemployed emerged in the nation mainly after January 1980. In a way, they are the product of the measures for stability which brought about a decrease in production or of the inadequate use of capacity and this is the most dangerous form of unemployment.

Up to this day the ANAP government has not taken any short or long term measures to decrease unemployment, it has not implemented any policy nor made any attempt to carry out any policy.

No Solution Can Be Found With This Policy

The SODEP [Social Democratic Party] Secretary General Atila Sav also claimed that they were the only ones who could solve the problem of unemployment and said:/"It is not possible to find a solution to the problem of unemployment by implementing the 24 January resolutions. Because in a period when production decreases and investments stop it would be a mistake to even think that a solution to unemployment could be found. This policy has no such aim. It is a delusion to expect unemployment to be prevented by such a policy. Preventing unemployment is our policy. The fight against unemployment is only part of the philosophy of social democratic parties."/

It Cannot Happen With This Government

The deputy leader of the Right Way Party, Gokberk Ergenekon, who also said that the economic policies implemented by the government and its investments were a delusion and that they did not believe the government could solve this question any more than any other question, spoke as follows:

/"In Turkey, where there is the possibility of creating a broad field of work for close to 1/2 million people annually, unemployment in the last 4 years has become the biggest social affliction. In addition to those who cannot find work because the investment impetus has stopped, the shutting down of a number of workplaces as a result of the economic measures which were taken leads to a rapid increase in the numbers of the unemployed. Thus, for the first time, the number of the open and hidden unemployed is higher than the number of insured, employed workers. For the greater part of the last 4 years the nation's economy has been directed by personalities of the present government. In his last press conference the Head of State announced that they would persist in their implementation of the same measures. Investment with such measures is a fallacy. Consequently, as is the case with other questions, we do not believe that this government can solve the problem of unemployment."/

12278

CSO: 3554/242

SURVEY OF ECONOMIC POLICY CHAIN OF COMMAND

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 3 Jun 84 p 11

[Article by Mehmet Ali Kislak "Who Is In Command of The Economy?"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Ankara (HURRIYET) - An extensive survey revealed that the Turkish economy is controlled by /Premier Ozal/ and Deputy Premier /Kaya Erdem/, the Finance and Customs Minister /Vural Arikan/, State Minister /Ismail Ozdaglar/, State Minister /Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemucin/, Foreign Trade And Treasury Adviser /Ekrem Pakdemirli/ and, from time to time, under the directorship of DPT[State Planning Organization] Adviser /Yusuf Ozal/, /Cahit Aral/ and /Adnan Kahveci/. Sources closely related to the workings of the economy's mechanisms told HURRIYET: /"No fundamental step can be taken in the economy without Ozal's approval. But the Premier has delegated most of the power to Ekrem Pakdemirli. As for the Economic Affairs Assistant Kaya Erdem, he has been pushed aside."/

It was pointed out that an important part of money credit policies, interest rates, issuing of money, rediscounts, credits, basic prices and foreign credit policies are determined and implemented by /Ozal/ and /Pakdemirli/. It was said that:/"Kaya Erdem has no part in the execution but he is a party to everything that goes on."/ /"In fact Kaya Erdem's administration of the economy would suffice but such is not the case. He acts like any other minister. He is a good person. He contributes very little to the work that is done. His mildness and maturity constitute a balancing factor,"/ it was added.

/Kaya Erdem/ told HURRIYET:/"It is the press that distorts those questions. It is obvious who directs the economy and who wields the power."/

It was claimed the Minister of /Finance and Customs Vural Arikan/:/"has a very strong personality, with his great financial power he heeds no one, he has a full command of his fields and is a very intelligent man."/ /"Apart from Ozal, he pays attention to no one else. If the Ministry of Finance were the old Ministry of Finance and Arikan had the powers of that time everyone would have had a very difficult time indeed. But now he is only responsible for collecting taxes. Had he been made of fire, wherever he was would burn,"/ it was added.

As for /Vural Arikan/ he said:/"I do not wish to meddle with anyone's business and I do not meddle. And I never speak unless I am asked for my opinion but it

but it appears that I may be talking entirely too much to journalists. For years I published my views in a variety of newspapers and magazines. Would I deny them now?"

A source that follows /Vural Arikan/'s stance from the inside of economic activities said: "As a matter of fact Arikan does not like at all what many officials chief among them Pakdemirli, are doing; he severely criticizes them behind closed doors but even more than those he thinks that Kaya Erdem is chiefly to be blamed."

It is an accepted fact that /Arikan/ is the "great expert" on subjects related to /taxes, taxation system laws, generating funds/ and generally speaking on all subjects related to revenues. It was also claimed that in developing the main idea in the general guidelines of the economy, the Treasury Director General /Tevfik Altinok/ and the President of the Central Bank /Yavuz Canevi/ played a very important technical role. A source well acquainted with the facts said: "Canevi and Altinok work out everything and leave only 20% of the work to those higher up."

But it was pointed out that /Ekrem Pakdemirli's "awful weight"/ hangs over /Canevi/ and /Altinok/. More than one source said of Pakdemirli: "Whatever he says has to be done. It is not that he totally dislikes discussion but because he wants to achieve results very fast he has no time for discussion. He has a totally practical intelligence."

While a Turkish ambassador who participated in some talks abroad with Pakdemirli said: "He is a most learned and intelligent man indeed. His mind works like a computer. He has all the necessary technical knowledge," another /Ankara/ high level official characterized /Pakdemirli/ as being "an over inflated expert with some technical knowledge who does not know very well how to put his work into practice."

2 Ministers have the responsibility for unemployment, the KITS [Public Economic Enterprises], the development of the 'South/ and the /East/, /the state's consumer policy/ and /some economic relations/. They are /Ozdaglar/ and /Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemucin/. The fact that the latter has no experience in statesmanship while the latter, particularly when /Pakdemirli/ was at his side abroad, "showed a very active behavior" gave rise to some problems. There were also those who complained about /Ozdaglar/ very often using /English/ words and expressions when talking to businessmen abroad.

In evaluating the 2 ministers of the State a source told /HURRIYET/: "In spite of his youth Ozdaglar is capable and he grasps problems fast. He is a good negotiator. He made serious contributions in preparing the ground prior to Ozal's visits.. As for Kurtcebe, he is very shy. But he is also a very capable person."

It is understood that the new Under-Secretary of the DPT, the Premier's brother /Yusuf Ozal/ will also gradually enter that circle. The fact the Premier issues directives like: "Let Yusuf also read this report.. Ask Yusuf's opinion also on this matter." is viewed as a sign that together with /Pakdemirli/ /Yusuf Ozal/ will also gradually come to the fore.

It is thought that the same kind of authority /Ozal/ obtained for /Pakdemirli/ by saying: "If there are any problems discuss them with Pakdemirli, do not bring them to me,"/ will also be given to his brother.

Outside this inner circle, it was also claimed that /Adnan Kahveci/ who is the Premier's Chief Councillor, has a big influence on the Premier in economic matters as in all other questions.

It was also claimed that /Cahit Aral/ could make his weight felt on some questions but that he preferred to stay in the background.

The following evaluation was made regarding /Turgut Ozal/'s position in general: /"At the same time that he assigns duties the Premier also bestows power and responsibility and after that he follows developments and, unless grave mistakes are made, he does not interfere. He does not meddle.. That way every one can work in peace."/

The officials to whom we spoke in the course of our investigation claimed that while /Ozal/ admitted that there were a lot of frictions among the /"economic team"/ this did not create any problems /"for the time being"/ and that work proceeded normally.

12278

CSO: 3554/240

MARKETING PRACTICES BLAMED FOR HIGH FOOD PRICES

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 3 Jun 84 p 11

[Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] HURRIYET NEWS AGENCY - It has been determined that the vegetables and fruit we are reduced to buying literally gram by gram because of their high cost in big cities like /Istanbul/ and /Ankara/ are very cheap in their areas of production but that because of the excess links in the /producer-consumer/ chain prices increase. According to the investigation carried out by the /HURRIYET NEWS AGENCY/ correspondents vegetables or fruit change hands 3 times before coming from the production area to the /Istanbul/central market. Transport costs added to this constitute another cause for higher costs.

The investigation the HURRIYET NEWS AGENCY correspondants carried out in production areas brought out the fact that tomatoes which cost /T.L. [Turkish Liras]90 in Antalya, T.L.70 in Izmir and T.L.120 in Adana/ are sold for /T.L.300/ in the /Istanbul central market/. At the same time for plums which children specially like and which in production areas like /Adana sell for T.L.100 and for T.L.150 in Bursa/ by the time they reach the /Istanbul central market/ these figures rise to /T.L.350/.

The fact that vegetables and fruit change hands several times between the production and the consumption centers is the cause of 3 to 4 times higher prices.

The Report Prepared by the Izmir Municipality

According to news from the /HURRIYET IZMIR NEWS AGENCY BUREAU/ on orders from the Prefect of the/Izmir Central Municipality Suha Baykal/ an investigating team constituted by members of the central market administration carried out detailed studies at the beginning of May in the /Mersin, Antalya, Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir/ areas. The resulting data astounded everyone. For instance, around the middle of /May/ it was determined that merchants who had closed deals on hothouse tomatoes from /Fethiye/ and its surroundings, instead of bringing them to /Istanbul/ and /Ankara/ to be sold in an environment of free competition sold them at prices fixed by themselves. The fact emerged, in particular, that tomatoes which at this time of the year sell at most for /T.L./150/ from the fields in /Fethiye/can be priced as high as T.L.400 for the same quality of tomatoes in /Ankara, Istanbul/ and/Izmir/. In the report submitted to the Izmir municipality administration at the end of the investigation

it was said that:/"The central market mafia, the market mafia, the brokers are the cause of the excessively inflated prices. In order to prevent this it is necessary for all vegetables and fruit brought into every municipality to go without fail through the central market in order to create a freely competitive environment."/

How Do Individuals Behind The Scenes Proceed?

The Izmir Municipality experts who explained in detail the reasons for vegetable and fruit prices increasing up to 3 or 4 times by the time they go from the producer to the consumer said the following:

/"At present trading in vegetables and fruit can take place in 3 manners. In the first the farmer takes his own produce and sells it directly in an environment of free competition. When such sales are made prices are determined according to that day's supply and demand and the owner of the produce pays a commission that varies between 3 to 5% to the central market broker. However, because of the pressures exerted by the central market "godfathers" this system is losing ground.

In the second type of transaction the situation changes. The middleman goes to the farm and buys the produce from the farmer and brings it to the central market and sells it there for his own account. In this case the vegetable and fruit follow the producer-middleman-retailer-consumer chain. Middlemen often follow this procedure at the beginning of a season when the fruit and vegetables are scarce and in their prime, making thus big profits. Average profits are over 30%.

As for the central market mafia, it functions differently, Middlemen or brokers get together and rent the land on which vegetables and fruit are grown and after that they determine prices as they wish. The most conspicuous example of this took place this year. There were those who dumped truckfuls of tomatoes into the sea in order to prevent tomato prices from falling."/

Who Rules The Market?

On the other hand, it has been established that the markets founded to enable producers to sell their goods directly to the citizens in big centers are simply controlled by the merchants. It was revealed that those people who are labelled the /"Market Mafia"/ by the/Izmir/Municipality experts who prepared the report buy the produce directly by going to the farms then bring it to the market in trucks and sell it to wholesalers and then the wholesalers distribute crates to the market vendors. The officials pointed out that if the producer could bring his goods directly this could be prevented and prices could drop.

In the study being carried out at present in connection with the progress of tomatoes cultivated in hothouses and fields, the following process can be seen in this vegetable's reaching the consumer through the normal channels:

When the producer loads his crop on a rented truck and brings it to Izmir he adds /T.L. 5 to 6/ per kilo transportation costs. The broker then takes a 3 to 6% commission from the producer on the goods that are sold. While the retailer who buys the goods pays a 3% municipal tax and sells at a profit of

30 to 35%.

According to another trend in trading which emerges in many of /Turkey/'s provinces at present, the middleman or broker rents the land wholesale and he even sometimes takes the merchandise personally in trucks to the big centers. In the course of such sales the wholesaler or the middleman tacks on a minimum profit of 60 to 80% to his own goods.

What Preventive Measures Can Be Taken?

In the report prepared by the Izmir Municipality it was pointed out that municipalities should directly control the prices of vegetables and fruit sold within their limits. /"When vegetables and fruit are taken out of the area in which they are produced a document from the prefect or alderman specifying the quantity, quality and price should be secured and should come with whoever makes the sale."/ It was also said that:/"If the hidden persons behind the sales of vegetables and fruit can be eliminated and standardization in packing can be ensured, foodstuffs could be sold in vegetable markets according to the supply and demand and prices could be determined accordingly."/

12278

CSO: 3554/240

STATE OIL FIRM MAKES HUGE COAL SALE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 29 Apr 84 p 7

[Article: "Neste Becomes a Coal Supplier for Turkey: Hundred Million Sale Astonished Other Sellers"]

[Text] Neste has become a thorn in the side of world coal sellers after making a sale of 100 million markkas' worth of coal for export to Turkey. Turkey organized a large bidding contest for its coal imports, which at the end turned close to an auction.

Already last year Turkey's coal imports aroused grudges among world coal sellers, as the Turks were accused of giving out unfounded information to the coal sellers, which led the highly competitive sellers to drop their prices below the limit of profitability.

Some respected coal sellers were so upset by Turkey's actions that they decided to stop participating in the "Turkish coal circus."

By selling 300,000 tons of metallurgical coal to Turkey, Neste immediately got the attention of world coal men. After Neste, only the American John K. Irish company has dared to export 100,000 tons of coal to Turkey. The price was the same as Neste's.

According to some coal experts, the sale arranged by Neste won't quite work out. Director Ulf Schmidt of Neste, however, denies that the Turkish sale will be made at a loss. According to him, Neste was able to obtain coal from a certain United States east coast coal supplier under such a favorable agreement that the sale to Turkey will be profitable. "We have a source of coal that the competitors didn't have," assures Schmidt.

Buyers Strong

Schmidt admits that in the present situation buyers are strong and they are trying to keep the price as low as possible. But Neste is not frightened, as the company is desirous of making additional sales to Turkey.

Neste is now placing additional efforts into foreign coal sales, because according to Schmidt the world market is slowly reawakening. The company still has an active proposal to open a coal mine in the Appalachian mountains on the east coast of the United States. Schmidt promises that a decision on the fate of the mine will be made during the summer. A decision on opening a mine had been promised already at the end of last summer.

ACTIVITIES OF MULTINATIONAL OIL COMPANIES IN COUNTRY

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 2 Jun 84 pp 18-19

[Article by Jorge Wemans: "The Pleasant Face of the Multinationals"]

[Text] There are five companies for a market amounting to 300 million contos: four multinationals and one national; and a business volume which, in 1983, represented a total of twice the deficit in the state budget anticipated for this year. In addition to oil, there is a presence in several other sectors of activity, through associated firms. The need for "controlling" tens of thousands of gas resale stations and 2,000 gasoline "pumps" used by concession holders has prompted the companies to reach the point of computerizing their administrative operations. In one and the same world, there is the prestige of being a firm in the group of the largest international companies and the war over the opening of a new station selling gas to the public.

What lies behind the man who, every day, fills the gas tanks of the 300,000 vehicles driven around Portugal? Through their account reports, their most significant ratios and the thinking of the different companies' administrators, EXPRESSO has attempted to give an idea of the reality of the world of oil, and the competition in that area.

Despite the limitations imposed on them for sales in the fuels sector, the four oil multinationals operating in Portugal have remained calm, forming a discreet "lobby" which cultivates good relations with the market's "glutton": Petrogal. Discreet and efficient, the "four sisters" are awaiting the end of the conditions to which they have been subjected, patiently, not wanting any major shocks: this may be claimed by Esso, which has been waiting 28 years for permission to sell automobile gas.

Making comfortable profits and growing within the limits set by law, only the retroactive nature of the administrative decisions prompts the soft-spoken members of the multinationals to raise their voices: "It is impossible to run a company well when, at the year's end, one does not yet know the marketing margins with which he is operating," as EXPRESSO was told emphatically by Thylbert Gheyselink, deputy administrator of Shell Portuguesa.

All the other officials of the multinationals operating on the market are attuned to the same pitch. But, to a large extent, this is by now a debate

of the past. The future is one of progressive liberalization of the market quotas (see inset); a liberalization that everyone upholds, including Petrogal. "We are in favor of competition. Even if we may possibly lose some portions of the market, we only stand to gain from competition; it is a stimulant for our efficiency and productivity," claim the managers of the sector's national company.

Visible Differences

However, the differences are visible. Immediately, and without further analysis, they exist in the air exuded at the different corporate headquarters of each company. Whereas the "Americans" (Mobil and Esso) exude computers through all their pores, the "Europeans" (Shell and BP) seem to be living at a different pace, wherein numbers do not appear dispassionate and precise at the terminal in the administrative secretary's office, but rather close, and enveloped in the rambling comments of the "boss." At Petrogal, the impression is different: the difference between it and the headquarters of the Bank of Portugal is slight. Rather than that of a business firm, what is exuded there is the air of an institution.

When analyzed, first impressions have their reason for existing. Whereas the business of the multinationals is selling, that of Petrogal is guaranteeing the supply of crude, the refining and the provisions for the companies operating in Portugal themselves, and, finally, selling directly.

So, while the multinationals' reports and accounts pay particular heed to the profitability of their own capital and to the dividends distributed, Petrogal writes, in its 1982 report: "During 1982, the company carried out its fundamental mission, constituting the reason for its existence (the regular supply of petroleum products to all parts of the country, even the least accessible and the least populated) in an economical, effective manner." Two concepts!

However, "respect" for the Galp and for all of Petrogal's activity, in terms of selling on the internal and "external" (international aviation and fleets) market is great among the multinationals; "not only because they start from a preeminent position on the market, but also because Petrogal offers us real competition," as multinational circles admit.

This competition exists for most of the petroleum products: gas, foreign market, lubricants, etc. The market quotas apply only to the gasolines (automobile, gas oil, fuel oil and kerosene). And all the companies attach value to the results that they achieve on the non-quota market: the multinationals, to prove the portion of the market that they could hold if it were entirely free ("we don't like having under 7-8 percent of the total sales, and we certainly would not if the market were freer," remarks Nascimento Cunha, Esso's president-general director); and Petrogal, to prove that with a system of open competition, it also accrues good results.

With or without competition, the relative positions of the five companies have experienced a certain amount of stability. Petrogal always sells more than twice the amount of all the others combined (in direct sales alone, it must have exceeded 200 million contos during 1983), followed by Shell (48 million), Mobil (31 million), BP (15 million) and Esso (6 million contos' worth sold in 1983).

Large sales in money, however, are not so critical as in other businesses. With products that are made very expensive as a result of the tax charge (as in the case of the gasolines), the sales volume appears to be heavily "inflated" and shows only small profit margins. BP officials claim: "We are real finance departments collecting taxes and turning them over to the state."

Collecting rapidly is, indeed, highly critical to the profitability of the business. Hence the computerization of the accounts of distributors, concession holders and clients. Despite the multinationals' effort to reduce the average periods for receipt, the economic crisis has had its effect and (here too) there are quite a few industrial firms consuming fuels or lubricants which have requested the renegotiation of their debts and longer payment plans.

In addition to this aspect, the economic recession has had its effect in two more ways on the existence of the five firms: on the shrinkage of the market, and the problems with the management fund. "Our greatest concern relates to big industry and its capacity for continuing to be a good client," stress the Shell officials, who nevertheless do not disregard the company's increasing problem of moving more money (in stocks, credit to clients and distributors, etc.) with profit margins that are increasingly smaller in relation to the total management fund.

Nevertheless, and despite the consequences of the economic recession, the multinationals are not in despair: The shrinkage of the market is something already experienced on other markets (two upheavals for oil have taught a great deal), and it is thought that, in Portugal, "the light at the end of the tunnel will be arriving also."

The position of the companies toward the number of gasoline resale stations, commonly known as "gasoline pumps," is more complex. While nearly all of them admit that there are too many "pumps" in the country ("the result of a competition between the former Sacor and Sonap," we are told at Mobil), Esso, because it is dissociated from this business, has an opposite opinion.

Nascimento Cunha, Esso's president-general director, is peremptory: "The gasoline distribution system is comparable to those in North Africa, and the Portuguese sales stations rank below any European rating." And, furthermore: "I disagree with the competition's opinion. In Portugal, the selection should have been made by the public, without any restrictions on the opening of new sales stations. But, obviously, I realize that this is not, nor should it be the government's main concern with regard to this business."

In fact, it is not, and the administration is still very stubborn about granting new permits and extremely demanding about meeting all the legal requirements in effect. Roughly speaking, out of a total of 2,000 gasoline stations Petrogal has 1,400 locations scattered throughout the country, Shell has 200, Mobil has about 200 and PB has 138. But whereas Mobil has started with self-service, using computerized control, Esso (if it procures the licenses to sell gasoline) is giving more consideration to the family business "pompas" with the concession holder aided by the entire family insofar as service to the customer is concerned.

However, the number of "pumps" is not the only important factor. It is important to be well situated geographically. There are sales posts which have 20 times more billing than others, yet with the same capacity. Hence, there is a war among the companies to gain those locations and not lose the new opportunities that the market has created, as in the case of Algarve. Hence, also, one of the arguments used by Petrogal: "We cover the entire country, whereas the multinationals are concentrated on the coastline, where the consumption is greater and business is easier."

The search for good locations even led to some sudden operations which took place recently. In the vicinity of Lisbon, a company had to give up the entire facility that it had in a certain location, just because its reseller had been "turned over" to another company which (in less than 24 hours) took everything that had belonged to the former and set up its own material, pennants and labels.

Diversification and Investment

Nevertheless, the oil crisis has had other more deepseated consequences than the spurring of competition among companies: It has prompted most of the large companies to diversify their area of action. Traditionally present in the mining and general energy sectors, the multinationals have entered other businesses, "which in most instances are not turning out very well," claim Shell officials, "and for this reason, 2 years ago, we witnessed the companies leaving branches of industry that they had entered in 1973."

This latter incident has not occurred in Portugal, however, because, as Shell explains, "The limitations to which we are subjected for the products based on quotas have forced us to invest in different areas." The policy of imposing commercial conditions has ended up having surprising results!

All the multinationals made the same claim that Mobil does: "If the market were based on open competition, we would invest far more, because we would have only our capacity as a limit on our growth. So, no one is going to invest only to be a loser." Despite this position, the companies' diversification is a fact. Whereas Shell is in solar, tourism, and mining (Alentejo) and oil prospecting, as well as chemical products with large household consumption, Mobil is concentrating on affiliation or participation in the lubricants area.


On the other hand, whereas Esso has but little participation besides the business that the parent company (Exxon) maintains in the area of mining and oil exploration, BP is now heavily involved in diversification ranging from solar to livestock feed and fish breeding, as well as chemical products (detergents and others) and mining exploration.

In one way or another, all the multinationals have been or are in the race for the coal supply to Sines. But that is an issue on which nothing specific could be learned.

In the present situation and in view of the foreseeable changes (see inset), two things in particular are certain for the five oil companies: New companies are not to be expected in Portugal, and no one is interested in refining. Esso obviously claims that it is already in Portugal (on nearly all the markets except auto gasoline and gas oil); and, despite the fact that it is "historically satisfied" with having obtained its first gas oil quota this year, as a company "interested in investing in Portugal we are not satisfied."

Refining is a "headache" in which no one wants to invest, in view of the excess installed capacity that exists in Europe. This is Petrogal's business, which the other companies claim as being well run: "Provided that Petrogal's prices are competitive, we purchase in Portugal the products that we sell in the country, and we even buy the raw materials to produce our lubricants here." This statement was made by Mobil, but it could be underwritten by all the other firms.

Although they are defenders of the free market (and without it in Portugal), the multinationals have not raised any objections to having the governments intervene in this business to protect the security of the supply and to require guarantees of those in the market. However, they want clearcut rules, fewer conditions imposed and more automatic regulation. On the other hand, they claim that they are not in any market "for 5-year periods," and they have an ardent desire to invest more in Portugal, a suggestion that the country seems to find hard to resist.




Key to Graph I:

1. Mobil: the most productive
2. Thousands of contos sold per worker
3. In 1983, every Mobil worker "sold" 91.200 contos. Petrogal is at the tail end of the chart: Despite the fact that it has a business volume 2.5 times larger than that of the other companies in the sector combined, the national company has in its service nearly 5 times more employees than the other four companies combined.

Gráfico II

(1) Petrogal: a mais dinâmica no mercado



(2)

Volume de vendas anual (1979 = 100)


1979 1982 1983

(3)

A Petrogal vendeu em 1982 três vezes o valor das suas vendas de 1979 e, em 1983, 3,8 vezes o que vendera em 1979. A Esso apenas cresceu, em relação ao valor das suas vendas 1979, 1,8 vezes (em 1982) e 2,3 vezes (em 1983).


Key to Graph II:

1. Petrogal: the most dynamic on the market
2. Annual sales volume (1979 = 100)
3. During 1982, Petrogal sold three times the amount of its sales for 1979; and, in 1983, 3.8 times what it sold in 1979. Esso, in comparison with the amount of its 1979 sales, increased only 1.8 times (in 1982) and 2.3 times (in 1983).




Key to Graph III:

1. Esso: larger profits
2. Net profits (in contos) per 1,000 contos sold in 1979, 1982 and 1983, respectively.
3. Although, from the stockholder's standpoint, the most important ratio may be that of net profits/own capital, the ratio of net profits/sales volume makes it possible to judge the company's capacity to accrue results based on the market that it has and the use for which it directs its gains: reserves, investment, dividends. From this standpoint, Esso accrues the largest profit for every 1,000 contos sold, while BP holds the opposite position. Petrolgal was not considered, because it has experienced some years with negative results.



Key to Graph IV:

1. BP: at the top of the investment
2. Investment (in contos) per 1,000 contos sold



Key to Graph V:

1. Shell: the best example
2. Note
3. Average annual base salary (in contos)
4. Total annual charges per worker (in contos)
Data relate to 1983
5. Whereas Mobil had the highest average salary of the five oil companies, Shell (through overtime pay and various social benefits) is the company which spends the most (on the average) for each of its workers.

2909

CSO: 3542/54

ENERGY OFFICIALS PRESENT POLICIES TO INTERNATIONAL BANK

Madrid ABC in Spanish 5 Jun 84 p 72

[Article by Jose Maria de Urquijo]

[Text] Martin Gallego and Carmen Mestre, secretary and director general, respectively, of the ministry of energy, will meet today in London with top officials of the International Bank in order to explain the recent measures affecting the electricity sector that have been approved by the government. The presidents of the major electricity companies will also attend this meeting, with the exception of Jose Maria Oriol, who is unable to attend the London meeting for reasons of health.

International financial sources who will attend the meeting informed ABC of their intention of explaining to the government representatives all of their doubts about certain points and aspects of the administration's policy in this field. It is quite possible that a number of those attending the meeting will express their views more or less strongly. In any event, everything will depend on the climate of diplomacy or frankness prevailing at the session. The meeting will be held in Butcher's Hall in London.

Reliable sources consulted by this newspaper expressed their intentions of determining the degree of commitment and support the Spanish government has for this sector.

In general outlines, the administration's representatives, acting in their official capacity, will attempt to "sell" the contents of its energy policy affecting this sector. One of the goals of Martin Gallego, representing the minister of industry and energy, Carlos Solchaga, will be to obtain some improvement in the credit terms which the International Bank now offers the electricity companies.

The bankers consulted by this newspaper expressed some doubts about the success of this mission, since interest rates are governed by market laws. In any event, they did not exclude the possibility that in some specific instances--everything will depend on the position of each company--some operations may be conducted temporarily at favorable terms.

The high level of the foreign currency debt is, without any doubt, one of the problems facing this sector. The balance of the foreign currency debt contracted before 31 December 1982 amounts to the equivalent of US \$7.754 billion. This large debt will still remain outstanding as of 31 December of this year, after the scheduled amortizations of \$517.4 and \$656.8 million, respectively.

The total amount to be cleared up during 1984, after determination of an adjustment to compensate for differences in valuation and the exchange rate for the foreign currency debt that is being used to finance facilities in operation, adds up to 250.265 billion pesetas. There are plans to pay this off over a 7-year period. This coincides with the average lifespan of the foreign currency loans. These figures mean that in 1984 the electricity sector will have to pay 35.752 billion pesetas, an increase of 17.103 billion pesetas over 1983.

7679

CSO: 3548/270

RESEARCH CENTER OFFICIAL ON METALLIC NODULES, LASER ALTIMETRY

Paris COLS BLEUS in French 7 Apr 84 pp 8-12

[Interview with Cdr Claude Riffaud, inspector general of the CNEOX (National Center for Exploitation of the Oceans)]

[Text] Question: Commander, in a speech you gave recently at the Naval Academy, you mentioned the prospects for the future that you see in the field of marine science and research. You agreed to give the readers of COLS BLEUS some additional information, and I thank you for that. My first question concerns the well-known polymetallic nodules. There has been a great deal of talk about them, and there is still much discussion now, but we never see them. Why is that?

Answer: That's right. The nodules were more or less the stars of oceanography in the 1970s. They were also like "the girl from Arles."* There was a lot of talk about them, but they were never seen. We can say that the difficulties related to their exploration, their collection, and their metallurgical processing were, and still remain, considerable. For 15 years a great deal of work has been done in these areas. Everything is not yet resolved; we are still far from that. But I think we can say this: if a country or an industrial group decided now, in 1984, for economic or strategic reasons, that within a time frame of 15 to 20 years, it needed to develop a particular resource from the marine environment, and consequently decided to devote at the appropriate time adequate research and organization resources--as was done for nuclear energy or space--it is probable that in the decades immediately following the year 2000 extraordinary technical breakthroughs would appear; most of the components of these techniques exist already, or are following a promising line of development.

* Tr Note: The protagonist of A. Daudet's short story, "L'Arlesienne," who never actually appears in the story.

That isn't true in all fields, but for nodules, I do think that this line of reasoning is plausible. We now have fairly good ideas about what to do to collect and use these nodules. And a number of industrial consortia are now working on agreements to avoid conflicts on the allocation of mining territories which have already been explored. If we disregard the fact that present provisions of the proposed Treaty on the Law of the Sea raise some serious uncertainties about the probabilities of exploitation, we can say, without great risk of error, that during the course of the next 15 to 20 years the nodules could be harvested.

Question: Are there other examples of techniques used in the marine environment which could produce results before the end of the century?

Answer: Still assuming that a firm decision is made to move ahead, as I said earlier, we can estimate that low or medium power generating plants, of about 10 megawatts, using the principle of thermal sea energy, could produce electricity on some sites within the tropics before the end of the century. Within 2 years a report may be presented to the government on this topic. This report concerns a project to build a pilot plant in Tahiti. It will cover the technical and economic aspects--including, in particular, a choice between open and closed cycles, a choice for large seawater supply ducts, which is a critical point in the facility, and of course, a cost estimate, thus the price per kWh to be provided in Tahiti.

Question: What about oil?

Answer: Other people would be more competent to tell you about oil. Though I am not a petroleum specialist, I can say that, as oil companies are now capable of exploration drilling 2,000 meters under the sea--that is a truly extraordinary technical feat--and considering the progress made in the field of production tools that can work independently on the seabed--that is, they are capable of doing without a huge surface infrastructure placed above or in the immediate vicinity of the well--the production of hydrocarbons from great depths under the sea could begin toward the end of this century. Assuming, of course, that interesting finds are made either along the edges or in deep basins.

Will hydrocarbons from deep under the ocean be extracted before hydrocarbons from the arctic regions? I don't know if we can answer that question. Too many parameters are involved. The volume of the deposits found will certainly play a decisive role.

Question: But all this is quite promising, isn't it?

Answer: Yes, of course. And you can't lag behind if you want to remain among the leaders of the major industrialized countries. But I would like to modify slightly what I just said: most of the experts agree that while these technical feats are now within our grasp, their only chance to become a reality will depend on a favorable economic context. And that means, to put it plainly, that the activities they support must promise to show a financial profit in the current market, or possibly, in a mid-term period. And no one can guarantee that today, unless they are accustomed to reading tea leaves to predict the future.

Rigid planning has its limits when it comes up against the constraints of reality. We can always say that the strategic concern of preserving supplies of raw materials will win out over profits on investments. We may also think of industrial reconversions, in terms of jobs gained or saved. That is a difficult subject. Speculation in such areas is risky, at best.

Question: You also spoke of the promise of space for a knowledge of the oceans. That seems paradoxical. What did you mean?

Answer: I'll explain that. Marine sciences are based on observation and measurements. Throughout history, all the progress which has shed a new light on our knowledge of the sea has generally not come in the beginning from the emergence of new theoretical concepts, but rather has come from a breakthrough in instruments. So, to read in the future instead of making an abstract statement: "What is the future of this or that sector of research?"--a question always shaded by the subjectivity of the person who answers it--it would be better to approach the question indirectly and ask: "What instruments will be available to this or that discipline tomorrow or in 10 years (a period of time that is easy to grasp)?" The answers to this question will not enable us to identify precisely the extent of the discoveries and the resulting areas of application, but they will shed a new light on the discipline under consideration, so long as the conditions are present making productive developments a possibility.

In order to illustrate this method, let's look at the recent past; for the last 25 years one discipline has dominated ocean research: geophysical geology, with a discovery of the first magnitude--the expansion of the ocean floors which, in one

generation, has completely renewed the earth sciences. What was the driving force behind this fantastic progress in such a short time? It was primarily the development of underwater acoustics after World War II, and also of related instrumentation (sounding devices, sonar, seismics, etc.). Other techniques have also played a major role: magnetometry, drilling deep under the water, the re-entry of drill rods in holes already drilled, the dynamic positioning of ships--the latter two techniques are also based on acoustics! In addition, there is diving and the use of underwater devices, but before everything else, it was submarine acoustics which opened up the way.

If we look toward the future, we don't need to be prophets to predict that the satellite will be the favored tool of the 1990s, and that the various active and passive sensors that it will place in orbit around the earth are going to revolutionize our knowledge of the dynamics of the oceans.

Question: You mean, our knowledge of ocean currents?

Answer: Scientists' ambitions are much more far-reaching. We want to better understand how the earth's thermal machine works. The ocean, heated at the equator by solar radiation and cooled in the higher latitudes, actually functions like a thermal machine. It has recently been demonstrated that it transports as much heat as the atmosphere does between the heat sources of the tropical zones where it stores calories and the cold sources of the glacial regions where it releases heat. The ocean is, therefore, a major element having an impact on climate. The severe floods which have just devastated Peru, the quasi-disappearance of anchovies off the Peruvian coast, the drought in Australia, and the recent cyclones in Polynesia are not brought about by the anger of some vengeful god: these are the inter-related effects of a modification in the ocean's dynamics and of the resulting energy transfer. These energy transfers are related to the movements of the water masses of the worldwide ocean. That is what we call oceanic circulation. What are its mechanisms and its geographic distribution? That is a big question that has not been answered yet.

Today we really can't explain well and interrelate, and thus predict, the phenomena that I have just mentioned, for we lack the data to supply and improve the models that are supposed to govern the ocean environment. The Poseidon, ERS 1, and Topex satellites, scheduled for 1988, which will provide global synoptic coverage, enabling us to explore regions that are hard to reach (ocean-sea ice borders, polar caps, Antarctica) will help us take a fantastic leap forward before the end of the century.

Satellites are going to give marine physicists a power of investigation that will be several orders of magnitude greater than what laboratories have today.

Question: Exactly what will they measure, and of what use will it be?

Answer: I won't bother to mention here what meteorological or earth observation satellites, such as Nimbus, Meteosat, NOAA, Landsat, Spot, etc., can already measure in the domains of the visible and infrared. All that is well known. The new satellites will have active sensors (VHF radars) designed to measure the height of waves, direction and force of the wind, and above all, the elevation of the ocean above a known reference surface.

Through the use of this method--called laser altimetry, which appears to be highly promising--we can determine with great precision the geometric surface of the oceans. By comparing this surface with the surface of a model ocean at rest, it is possible to calculate the currents of superficial water masses (or geostrophic flow), and consequently, the corresponding mechanical and thermal transfers. Energy exchanges between the ocean and the atmosphere, and therefore, weather forecasting, are based on a knowledge of these dynamic and thermal transfers.

Question: From space, let's now go to the ocean floor. A lot of work seems to be in progress now on the seabed of the Pacific between Easter Island and the Galapagos Archipelago. What are people looking for there?

Answer: They are looking for "hydrothermal sources" and an explanation of this type of phenomenon. This is a field which, both because of its scientific impact and its possible economic spinoffs, has a great chance of drawing the attention of scientists over the next 20 years. In 1977, 1978, and 1979, the French and U.S. submarines "Cyana" and "Alvin" found massive deposits of polymetallic sulfides on the ridge line in the Eastern Pacific near the Galapagos and near the 21°N parallel, at a depth of 2,000 meters. These deposits were found around "hydrothermal chimneys" which spit out above the seabed fluids with a temperature higher than 350°C. This phenomenon had been suspected, and core samples indicated its existence in the Red Sea, but this was the first time that it was actually found, and that we could really touch it, if we can use that expression. The samples taken out contained up to 21 percent zinc, 6 percent copper, silver, cadmium, gold, platinum, and lead. These discoveries open up considerable areas of research related to structural geology, geophysics, and geochemistry of the oceans.

During the years to come, if we can persevere in working on such a clearly defined objective, if the technological challenges are met, it is clear that this "open window on the earth's mantle" will help us to better understand the mechanisms of the expansion of the ocean floor and of the geochemistry of the oceans. Both of these topics are related to the concentration of minerals and their placement in a deposit. And that is certainly an important topic, if anything is.

Question: That is an applied research objective?

Answer: Yes. It is tempting to say that these hydrothermal deposits, just like the nodules, are, if not actually a mineral "reserve" that can be mined rapidly, depending on market conditions and current technology, at least a "resource" that is potentially exploitable in the future.

But for the time being, we know almost nothing about their distribution, their homogeneity, and their mass. Several square kilometers have been explored and there are tens of thousands of kilometers to be investigated.

Question: How do you intend to do it?

Answer: Your question gives me an opportunity to mention a field that, more than any other, will be the field of the future. It concerns methods of intervention under the sea. In the preceding example--prospecting for hydrothermal sites--if we stayed with the methods now in use, based on visual observation through the portholes of a submarine, it would take no less than two or three centuries of continuous work to survey just the portion of the ridge of the Eastern Pacific. So it is clear that we have to renovate our methods from top to bottom, if we want at least to explore, for both scientific and industrial (or pre-industrial) purposes, in a reasonable period of time.

If there is one concept which is taking on a growing importance throughout the submarine world, it is the need to remain on the ocean floor, to provide continuity in visual or other observations, and to repeat actions there. That is true for the needs of science and also for industry.

Only a robot can meet these requirements satisfactorily. I think that within one generation the robot will be able to replace man under the sea in most cases. That doesn't mean that man will no longer have a place under the sea, but that place will become more and more marginal.

Question: What about harvesting living resources, fishing, and aquaculture? You haven't mentioned those, Commander.

Answer: I would have if you had asked me about them! But in this interview, I intended to discuss just the areas that are essentially new, which may have an impact on the future, major innovations that we can expect or that we can already glimpse now.

Fishing is, you will agree, an activity that is as old as the world itself. That by no means is intended to suggest that it isn't important. My feeling is that there will be no revolution in this sector during the next 15 to 20 years. The entire catch throughout the world has little chance of experiencing a significant growth, for the very good reasons that the supply of available resources can not be expanded, and that the present catch is already at a high level. However, we may expect major gains in a more rational approach to fishing and in productivity.

Aquaculture may eventually lead to a significant increase in resources. That is true and it bears repetition. But its development will depend--in my opinion--more, or at least as much, on patience and perseverance than on scientific and technical breakthroughs.

7679

CSO: 3519/347

BRIEFS

ACID RAIN DAMAGE ASSESSED--Acid rain has caused about 700 million markkas' worth of losses to Finnish forests, Antti Kulmala, chairman of the Air Protection Commission, estimated in Hollola in his Paijat-Hame Nature Day speech. Antti Kulmala, who works as section chief at the Atmospheric Institute, said that southern Finland has continually been receiving as much acid precipitation as corresponding areas of neighboring countries. "Progress in Finland is 10-15 years behind. Destruction of small lakes began to appear in Scandinavia about 15 years ago, and we have had it mainly in the desolate plateau lakes of Uusimaa and Varsinais-Suomi." Since forest deaths have already been observed in southern Scandinavia, Finland should be starting to act, in Kulmala's opinion. "We can significantly affect the burden, because half of the air pollution is of domestic origin," he said. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 29 May 84 p 7] 9611

CSO: 3617/169

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13 July 1984